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Abstract 
 
This thesis aims to show the financial accelerator mechanism in the housing sector using 
Norwegian data for the period 1995-2010. Housing is the most important investment decision 
an agent makes during his/her lifetime. Most Norwegian households own their own home and 
have during the last 15 years experienced an astonishing 400% nominal rate of return on their 
investment. Mortgage Equity Withdrawal (MEW) is a relatively new phenomenon that allows 
households to withdraw money from increasing housing markets to finance increased 
spending today. Seeing that more than 50% of household assets are tied to housing, adverse 
changes in the housing market will consequently have severe repercussions for the rest of the 
economy through the MEW channel. Real and monetary shocks hitting the economy affect 
the net worth of households and therefore amplify and propagate the initial shock, making it 
more persistent and longer lasting. This is known as the financial accelerator in the literature.  
 This thesis is divided into two parts. First, I estimate a closed economy New 
Keynesian Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model for Norwegian data using 
a Bayesian framework. I then look into the importance of collateral effects in amplifying 
monetary shocks to the economy and hypothesise what would happen if the wage share of the 
credit constrained consumers increase. I find that during the last decade, there has been a 
liberalisation of credit markets and it has become increasingly easier to obtain credit, leading 
to the consumption boom we are experiencing. Having realised that the sheer size of 
household debt has grown substantially more than income the last couple of decades, it is a 
concerning development and one that should not be taken easily. Second, I look into the 
monetary policy rule and theorise whether central banks should aim to stabilise asset prices as 
well as keeping inflation and output stable. I find that incorporating asset prices in the policy 
specification of the central bank leads to a statistically insignificant coefficient. This is not in 
contrast to the literature on this field of research, although some studies have conversely 
found that it will be welfare enhancing for the central bank to stabilise asset prices as well.  
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 1 Introduction 
 
“Ever tried. Ever failed. No matter. Try again. Fail again. Fail better.”  
          Samuel Beckett   
 
Housing is the most important single asset in most households’ portfolios. The biggest 
investment decision households make is whether or not to enter the housing market. Adverse 
changes in the housing market will therefore have severe repercussions for the rest of the 
economy. The main goal of this paper is to estimate and analyse a DSGE model incorporating 
financial frictions in a closed economy using Norwegian data. There is a large literature with 
a primary focus on the financial accelerator mechanism going through the balance sheet 
channel of firms, and some also focus on the less known, the exchange rate channel 
amplification mechanism. I will, however, focus on the financial accelerator within the 
housing sector and the effect going through collateral constraints. I wish to see how the 
financial accelerator applies to Norwegian data in a DSGE model incorporating 
heterogeneous consumers; households following a permanent income hypothesis (PIH) and 
households displaying a Rule-of-Thumb (ROT) type behavioural pattern. The financial 
accelerator theory postulates that positive real and monetary shocks to the economy that lead 
to increased asset prices will, through a collateral effect, also lead to increased consumption 
today. The mechanism in play here is as follows. When house prices increase, the net wealth 
of households with a mortgage increases as well. Households will then have more negotiation 
power and can demand lower interest rates or even withdraw equity through a Home Equity 
Loan. The increased purchasing power will then lead to increased consumption today. The 
amplification and propagation mechanism at work here is called the financial accelerator. I 
estimate a closed economy New Keynesian DSGE model using a Bayesian approach. I 
calibrate the relevant parameters and estimate the others for the period 1995Q1-2010Q4. I 
then move on to implement asset prices (residential and non-residential prices) into the 
monetary policy specification.    
 I find that the impulse responses are amplified when collateral effects are present. This 
is most clear when we look at monetary and real shocks since these types of shocks directly 
affect asset prices and hence affect the balance sheet of the households.  I also take a closer 
look at the wage share of the unconstrained households. I believe that a reduction in this wage 
share proxies for increased ROT consumers or even the case of restricting the ease of credit 
unrelated to housing. I find that increased ROT type consumers amplify the shock and lead to 
a marginal effect on GDP, increased effect on real house prices and also increased effect on 
consumption when compared to the case of no collateral effects.   
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2 Defining the financial accelerator and 
financial frictions 
2.1 The financial accelerator 
Defining the financial accelerator is not an easy task, isolating the financial effect is not 
exactly a walk in the park either. Loosely spoken, the financial accelerator theory postulates 
that shocks that increase (decrease) the net worth of an agent also lead to an additional effect, 
other than the wealth effect, through the increased (decreased) credit worthiness of agents and 
hence to reduced (increased) cost of borrowing. The change in the cost of borrowing will then 
amplify and propagate the initial business cycle leading to more persistent and stronger effects 
on the general economy. Bernanke et al. (1996) refer to this amplification of initial shocks 
brought about by changes in credit-market conditions as the financial accelerator.  
The Modigliani-Miller theorem states that when there are no market frictions, like complete 
markets with perfect information and no transaction costs, it is irrelevant how a corporation 
finances itself; be it by debt or equity. This is, nonetheless, a restricting assumption as without 
market frictions financial markets have no reason to exist. The recent financial crisis is a clear 
indicator that market frictions are in fact present and can have drastic consequences for the 
world economy. Modelling the real world as if there are no market frictions is a naïve point of 
view. The Financial accelerator is largely due to financial frictions arising from imperfect 
information such as asymmetric information leading to Principal – Agency problems. 
Asymmetric information is defined as a case where one party in a transaction has more 
information than the other.  The corresponding agency problems are more severe when the 
incentives of the principal and the agent do not align.  
An important channel financial crises affect the real economy is through the creditworthiness 
of borrowers. A borrower gets extra liquidity through posting collateral, i.e. the accessibility 
of collateral give support to credit extension. Posting collateral for a loan reduces the lender`s 
risk and therefore makes sure that the borrower (agent) and the lender (principal) both have 
the same incentives towards the collaboration.  It is this risk that is given value in the market 
and its very own definition, of which we turn to next. Bernanke et al. (1999) introduce 
asymmetric information and agency costs in lending relationships, and hence, define a wedge 
between the opportunity cost of funds raised internally and the cost of funds raised externally, 
called the external finance premium (EFP). In other words it is the difference between 
financing a project internally, like withholding dividend pay-outs, and obtaining external 
financing, like a bank loan. Due to agency problems, obtaining external credit is almost 
always more expensive than internal finance; debt versus equity. This will in most cases be 
true unless the debt is fully collateralised.  Hence, the external finance premium is in most 
cases a positive number. And as such, the external finance premium depends heavily on the 
financial position of the borrower; the premium charged is then said to be inversely related to 
the net worth of the borrower. The richer an agent is, i.e. the more collateral he can post, the 
 less risk the lender takes on and will therefore require a lower premium. The other way 
around, if the borrower is in a dire financial position, the lender will charge a higher premium 
as he faces higher default risk, the so called “flight to quality”. A borrower in a better 
financial position has also greater incentives towards making better informed decisions and 
evaluating the risk accordingly and will therefore also require less monitoring costs. He is said 
to have more “skin in the game”.  
Events that change financial and credit conditions of agents, like real or monetary 
shocks, are important in the propagation of the business cycle, i.e. it amplifies the initial effect 
into bigger static and dynamic multipliers in the different periods, as shown in Kiyotaki and 
Moore (1997). The oil crisis in the 70`s are often used as an example of small initial shocks 
that led to persistent fluctuations. Changes in financial conditions may intensify the effect of 
monetary policy on the economy; this is often called the credit channel of the monetary-policy 
transmission.  
 
 Figure 1 – Illustrated the financial accelerator effect of a negative temporary productivity shock to the 
economy.  
It is through this key term that the amplification mechanism comes in to effect. Kiyotaki and 
Moore (1997) show that a negative temporary productivity shock to the economy will lead to 
reduction in activity, consumption, investment, and through a multiplier effect, an additional 
worsening of activity. This is known as a static multiplier. The negative temporary shock has 
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then led to reduced asset prices. This effect goes through the reduction in the net worth of 
liquidity constrained firms and households  asset demand falling  user cost of assets fall 
since the marginal productivity falls for the liquidity constrained agents. 
The authors also incorporate a dynamic multiplier mechanism that comes into play in the 
second period and stays around for several other periods. The asset prices fall further due to 
the reduced asset in the previous period  net worth of constrained firms and households fall 
yet again (increasing the EFP) because of higher default probability  further fall in asset 
demand  further fall in user cost, and this goes on and on until the small temporary shock to 
the economy has been dramatically increased, propagated and amplified the business cycle. 
This affects the first period asset price because the asset price is simply the discounted value 
of future user costs. 
A reasonable assumption is that net worth is procyclical, seeing that profits and asset prices 
are generally greater in good times. The external finance premium, on the other hand, is 
generally considered countercyclical as it amplifies the cycle through the accelerator effect on 
aggregates like investment, production and consumption. Gelain (2010), however, casts doubt 
on the generally assumed countercyclicality of the EFP. He found out that depending on the 
shock hitting the economy, the EFP may in fact turn out to be procyclical. While agency costs 
in credit markets will generally be countercyclical since a monetary relaxation that leads to 
lower interest rates also generates a real economic boom that improves the balance sheets of 
firms. This then lowers agency costs and thereby raises the efficiency of allocation.  
 
2.2 The financial accelerator in the housing sector 
 
Empirical findings suggest that there is an economic link to house prices and consumption, 
suggesting that they move together. If increases in housing prices lead to increased housing 
transactions then this link may be explained by the increased demand for housing appliances; 
like furniture and curtains for instance. Housing goods and consumption goods are likely to 
increase if agents are rather optimistic regarding future economic prospects. This link is, 
perhaps, best explained through the credit market effect, suggesting the importance of the 
collateral effect in obtaining credit from intermediaries. There is every reason to believe that 
the financial accelerator also applies to households and their consumption of housing and 
housing services. It is this latter effect that gives rise to the term “the financial accelerator 
theorem in the market for housing.” Households generally have most of their wealth tied up in 
the house they own and are therefore quite perceptible to shocks and events that change their 
net-worth. Aoki et al. (2004) argue that in the case of financial assets, an increase in the price 
would lead to an outward budgetary shift. While in the case of house prices on the other hand, 
this wealth effect may not be present. They notice that even in a finitely lived household, an 
increase in house prices just leads to a redistribution away from a first time borrower to the 
last-time seller, not an increase in aggregate per se. And since most home owners live in their 
 own house they optimise until the benefits of an increase in house price is directly offset by 
the opportunity costs of housing services.  
Quite like firms, households face an external finance premium that is inversely related to their 
financial position as well. The higher the loan-to-value (henceforth LTV) ratio is the higher 
the premium the households face. The financial accelerator is in fact amplifying the effect to 
account for more than the traditional theory around wealth effects suggest. Collateral is fairly 
important as consumers are in reality using the value of their house to obtain higher 
consumption through increased borrowing to the face value of the house, so called mortgage 
equity withdrawal (MEW). Soaring house prices lead to more collateral being available to the 
households and therefore more money can be borrowed from intermediaries to finance 
increased consumption and investment. House prices are in this respect exceedingly cyclical, 
leading to large discrepancies in the net worth of households and then to large discrepancy in 
consumption through the MEW effect. Another important mechanism to remember is that 
households that are not able, or willing, to withdraw equity may still benefit from increasing 
housing prices due to decreasing LTV ratios, and  hence, benefit from lower interest rate 
spreads. The reduced cost of borrowing may then signal households to consume more or 
perhaps even take up more loans. The EFP will here benefit them in good times, and of course 
harm their financial position in bad times. An underlying assumption within MEW is that 
households are said to be smoothing consumption over their lifetime, so called permanent 
income hypothesis (PIH). Empirically, however, there is evidence for some households 
actually behaving according to a rule-of-thumb/constrained manner (see Gali et al. (2004)). I 
will of course embellish on this in later chapters.  
 Is there evidence for rising housing prices having led to the consumption boom of the 
last decades? In Iacoviello (2005), the author lists several elasticities found from other papers 
suggesting positive long-run elasticities of consumption to housing prices of around 0,06 for a 
panel of US data, and a long-run elasticity of consumption to housing wealth of 0,08. He 
raises concern regarding the life-cycle model; whether it is being too constrained in the belief 
that rising housing prices lead to gains being equally distributed, when we should in fact have 
unchanged demand with the assumption of same propensity to consume for both types of 
consumers. In fact, according to Iacoviello, the impatient households will, ceteris paribus, end 
up increasing consumption more than their patient counterparts due to their more impatient 
nature.  
  The housing sector is a tricky thing to isolate. First of all, just like other assets 
households hold, an increase in house prices leads to a direct wealth effect and should 
according to micro theory lead to increased consumption. It is, however, not as easy as that. 
Campbell and Cocco (2007) noticed that the theoretical rationale for a large housing wealth 
effect is rather vague. They go on to further argue for their view: “If we define financial 
wealth as the sum of liquid financial assets and the value of real estate minus debt 
outstanding, it is clear that an increase in house prices leads to an increase in homeowners` 
financial wealth. But this doesn`t necessarily mean that their real wealth is also higher.” 
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Housing is considered a consumption good, and therefore an increase in house prices must be 
seen as increased benefits of not having to pay higher rent in the rental market. In this view 
there are no real wealth effects and should consequently not have any effect on consumption 
either, conditioned of course on substitution effects being absent as well. Second, as already 
argued above, the borrowing constrained households wish to withdraw the increased equity of 
the house to smooth consumption over time, and thereby increasing consumption now. 
According to a household survey in Norway completed in 2006, about 4 out of 10 households 
are actually willing to do a Mortgage Equity Withdrawal, MEW
1
.  Half of them do this to 
increase their consumption today, one quarter do so to transfer funds to their heirs, and one in 
ten wish to save the money instead.  
Most mortgage contracts in Norway are in fact variable mortgage rates. Unlike the 
case of the United States and Denmark, the cost of refinancing a mortgage contract in Norway 
are slightly higher and therefore allows the borrower to a lesser degree to adjust mortgage 
rates when interest rates fall. We could look into how big effect monetary policy has on 
different households with different mortgage contracts. Theory suggests that Norway, which 
has a higher fraction of homeowners with flexible interest rates contracts, will be more 
susceptible to changes in monetary policy than in the US, where a fixed interest rate is more 
common.  
“…In countries like the United Kingdom, for example, where most mortgages have 
adjustable rates, changes in short-term interest rates (whether induced by monetary policy or 
some other factor) have an almost immediate effect on household cash flows.  If household 
cash flows affect access to credit, then consumer spending may react relatively quickly.  In an 
economy where most mortgages carry fixed rates, such as the United States, that channel of 
effect may be more muted.”       Bernanke (2007) 
 
Rubio (2009) reach the same conclusion as Bernanke in her study of variable versus fixed 
rates mortgage contracts. 
 One can also distinguish between predictable and unpredictable changes in house 
prices. Campbell and Cocco (2007) argue that forward looking households may in fact realise 
the wealth effects of house price changes well in advance of the actual change, as soon as they 
form the expectation of the change coming. A predictable change, however, will still help 
relax the borrowing constraints, even if there is no wealth effect. The reason is that the 
predictable change has already been anticipated. This is in contradiction to the permanent 
income hypothesis which postulates that consumption is only affected by unpredictable 
changes in income. This will of course complicate the effect considerably, and as such will 
require two assumptions. First, only when increased house prices are realised will housing 
become available as collateral, and not when it can be predicted. Second, and lastly, 
borrowing capacity depends on current house prices, and not on the purchase price of the 
                                                 
1
 The survey and the report is found here, albeit in Norwegian: 
http://www.sparebankforeningen.no/id/13456.1 
 house. They also estimate the house price elasticities of consumption both for an old cohort 
and for younger consumers. The main conclusion to be had from this paper is that the old 
have a higher elasticity of consumption, while the younger consumers have an elasticity that 
is insignificantly different from zero. This may be due to the notion that increased house 
prices will lead to younger/first-time-buyers ending up with a lot less liquidity, and will not be 
able to achieve the high consumption the permanent income hypothesis suggests. This leads 
to the conclusion that as the baby boom grow older, the old will stand for a greater portion of 
the population, and then consumption will also be more responsive to changes in house prices. 
However important as this fact may be, it is also something I will disregard in this paper due 
to the complications of modelling it in my highly stylised model. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 – Financial accelerator in the housing market, only static effects are displayed.  
 
What I will focus on here will be mainly on unpredictable house price movements, on 
the collateral effect, and how this may be affected by borrowing constraints; leading to 
changes in the borrowing opportunities of households.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Expansionary Monetary Policy Shock 
Increased Housing Demand 
Increased Housing Prices and Homeowners` Net Worth 
Reduced EFP 
Further Increase in Housing Demand and Consumption 
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3 Key Characteristics of the Housing 
Sector  
3.1 Household saving and investment 
In this section I will take a closer look at the savings behaviour among Norwegian households 
and do a cross-country comparison of the savings rate and investment choice, and try to 
characterise Norwegian households’ asset holdings and liabilities. Most importantly I will 
look at the how the acquired Home Equity Loan is spent among the households; saving the 
proceeds or spending it on increased consumption today.   
Figure 3 depicts the savings rate during the last two decades for Norwegian households and 
several other countries that it is natural to compare us with. Norwegian households save in 
several different ways. Norwegian saving ratio was in the early 2000s quite volatile in 
comparison to the other countries saving ratios. Notice also the large drop in the savings rate 
from 10% in 2005 to 0.1% in 2006, only to rise again to around 7% in 2010. This big fall in 
the saving ratio was mostly because of the change in dividend tax that was announced in 
2006.  
 Figure 3 – Cross-country savings rates. Data: OECD, Economic Outlook No. 88 
Saving is defined as the net amount of labour income, net capital income and net transfers that 
is not consumed. For the Norwegian population the government is doing most of the saving as 
ridiculous amounts of money are extracted from the North Sea every day. In fact, 4 out of 5 
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 NOK saved are done by the government. This saving is, however, not depicted in figure 3 as 
it only depicts households and non-profit institutions. The government’s claims have 
increased a lot more than its obligations, while the households claim versus obligations has 
been relatively constant. A significant portion of household wealth is tied to deposit accounts 
and claims to money from insurance and pension funds; of which are highly illiquid in the 
short and medium term. The households are investing only a small portion of their wealth in 
the stock market, and are therefore to a certain degree not exposed to the volatility in the stock 
market. Norwegian households saving ratio was negative in the 80`s and turned positive and 
relatively stable in the 90`s. Last decade it turned more volatile and reached a level of 7,4% in 
2010. A concerning factor regarding the recent developments in the financial statements of 
households is that the growth in income has lately not kept up with the growth in household 
debt. The last decade brought about a period of low interest rates and liberal lending practices.   
Norwegian households save in several different respects. While until recently only a small 
portion saved in the stock market, an increasing part of the population is now also investing in 
shares and bonds. We also see a trend towards more complicated portfolios as well. This may 
be due to the need for diversification of risk or even because of the ever-lasting search for 
yield due to low interest rates in the aftermath of the financial turmoil. The Norwegian 
households are still heavily built up of “safe” investments, as more than half of the financial 
assets of the households are tied to housing. Housing, as an asset, is in itself rather safe 
investment for the individual household, but it is also fundamentally unsafe for the general 
economy. As will be elaborated more in later chapters.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 4 – Total financial assets for Norwegian household 
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 Figure 4 – Financial liabilities of Norwegian households2  
 
Figure 6 shows the structure of the debt for Norwegian households over a 15 year period. 
Mortgage backed loans and other loans using homes as collateral stand for approximately 
71% of the household debt. One of the main contributors for this development is the increased 
popularity of Home Equity Loans (HEL). This is also the channel through which households 
are withdrawing money from the housing market, the so called MEW. In March 2010 the 
Financial Supervisory Authority of Norway (FSA), Finanstilsynet (2011), established 
guidelines they suggested the banks to follow. They recommended that the LTV ratio should 
generally not exceed 90% on market value of the home, and in the case of HEL this rate 
should be fixed at 75%. The regulatory authorities gather data from annual bank surveys they 
conduct. Based on these surveys they found that in 2010 approximately 21% of mortgages 
had a LTV ratio exceeding 90%, and shockingly 9% of the mortgages had in reality an 
outstanding mortgage above the home market value. The mortgages the households are 
getting are in almost all cases flexible interest rate contracts, and an increasing proportion 
include a no annuity period. Considering HEL, 89% of the cases in 2010 were under the 75% 
the authorities suggested, implying a sound financial state of the economy. The survey also 
concludes that a large portion of the households withdrawing equity from their homes are in 
fact spending the proceeds on buying a car, boat or even a cabin. HELs are, according to the 
report, used mostly on goods other than housing services and investment in own home. It is 
however alarming that the increase in HEL usage has also led to decreasing down payments 
of the total outstanding mortgages in Norway.  
                                                 
2
 The table with the associated values for graph 4 and 5 can be found here, albeit in Norwegian: 
http://www.ssb.no/emner/08/05/10/oa/201101/08hushold.pdf 
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3.2 Developments in the housing sector  
The Housing market has increased fourfold since the 90`s. Early 2011, it was about 7% higher 
than the peak in 2008, the weeks prior to the Lehman collapse and the beginning of the 
financial crisis that led to crashing housing markets in several different parts of the world. In 
comparison, the CPI has only increased by 45% during this same period, and the costs of 
construction about 82%. Clearly, the price increase in the housing sector is not even remotely 
due to construction costs only. One might argue that because of people’s aversion towards 
selling at a loss, house prices are generally sticky on the way down, as opposed when the 
market is booming. Norway has one of the most deregulated housing markets in Europe as 
well. Sweden, Denmark, United Kingdom, Netherlands and Austria, all have government 
regulated housing markets. All of which provide price regulated government constructed 
housing. Norwegian authorities deregulated a heavily regulated housing market up until the 
1980s leading to people’s savings and private equity entering the equation. The housing 
market was liberalized; the prohibition against pre-emptive regulation and other price 
regulations was launched, as well as selective instruments directed towards first-time buyers. 
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 Figure 7 – The housing market in a 20 year perspective. Source: SSB, Economic analysis 1/2011.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 8 – Percentage change in house prices on a year to year basis. Source: SSB, Economic analysis 
report 1/2011. 
 
 Graph 8 depicts the percentage deviation on a year to year basis. As we clearly see from the 
graph, in the period of the boom preceding the dot-com bubble the growth in the housing 
market was quite high, 14% in 2006 and 13% in 2007. The financial crisis brought about a 
year of negative growth, only to pick up again a year later.   
Graphs 9 and 10 compare the Norwegian housing market with several countries it is natural 
for us to compare us with. The Real percentage change, inflation adjusted, shows a similar 
picture, but here Norway is rather volatile and has had a bigger growth in real house prices 
than the other countries in the figure. In 2008 and 2009 the housing market in several parts of 
the world was characterised by a standstill. Recently, however, in Norway we see that the 
housing market has picked up again. High unemployment rates, pessimistic expectations 
regarding future growth and debt issues still characterise the housing market in these 
countries. In the US a high fraction of default rates and REPO rates has increased the supply 
of homes depicting a still gloomy housing market. The Swedish housing market has lately 
picked up like the Norwegian housing market and the FSA in Sweden has prepared guidelines 
towards reducing LTV ratios. Iacoviello (2005) argues that the rising house prices have kept 
consumption growth high for the last couple of decades in the US. This might be the case for 
Norway as well, although the MEW channel is a relatively new feature for Norwegian 
consumers.  
 Figure 9 – Cross-country comparison of nominal changes in house prices over previous period. Source: 
OECD. 
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Figure 10 – Cross-country comparison of real changes in house prices over previous period. Source: 
OECD 
 
3.3 Determinants of the housing market 
 
One may ask which factors play an important role for the developments in the housing 
market. In the short run the growth in the housing market may be determined by, as indicated 
by Tsatsaronis and Zhu (2004) as well: 
 Availability, cost and flexibility of debt financing 
 Number of potential housing consumers and their financial resources and tastes 
 Transaction costs such as inheritance tax, registration duties, and the level of value 
added tax (VAT) 
 Different ways of measuring user cost of housing that account for deductibility of 
mortgage interest rates 
 Uncertainty, periods of high volatility in the housing market will often lead to reduced 
future predictions and more cautious construction behaviour  
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In the longer term the housing market is determined by: 
 Average level of the interest rate set by the central bank 
 Demographics 
 Household disposable income 
 Permanent changes in the tax system that encourages investing in housing rather than 
other financial assets 
 Availability and cost of land 
 Production costs and the cost of investments that aim to improve the quality of 
existing housing stock 
 
Tsatsaronis and Zhu (2004) use a structural vector autoregression (SVAR) framework on 
cross country data and find that the most prominent explanation for what drives house prices 
is the inflation rate. Inflation is the driver of housing prices and on average it explains almost 
half of the total variation in the house prices at the five-year horizon. Being even larger in the 
short run, almost 90% of the variation is driven by inflation. The authors reason that this may 
be due to the interlinkage of housing; acting both as a consumption good and an investment 
good. Households are believed to hedge against risks of rising inflation through real estate. 
The BIS authors also argue that a second explanation for inflation being such an important 
driver of housing prices is because inflation affects the cost of mortgage financing and it may 
also act as a proxy for the prevailing financing conditions.  
The second most important factors determining the developments in the housing market are: 
spreads, bank credit and short-term interest rates. The authors conclude that they are equally 
important and that they together stand for approximately one third of the variation in the 
housing market in the long run. Income, on the other side, is of shockingly small relevance in 
explaining the variations. In other words, it matters less what the income of the household is 
as long as the mortgage payments are low enough when deciding whether to purchase a new 
home or not. This is also the case for Norwegian consumers. What matters is the capability of 
households in taking on and servicing new debt, and to a lesser degree the income of the 
households.  
In countries with more flexible interest rate mortgage contracts and more market based 
property valuation practices for loan valuation, the authors find evidence for a stronger 
feedback mechanism from property prices to credit growth. As is also the case for Norway, 
since most of these determinants are present in the Norwegian housing market. In fact, only 
3% of total mortgages in 2010 were on fixed rate contracts.  
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One might wonder if housing prices need to decrease at all and if they generally do so 
in practice. The housing market was a contributing factor in dampening the slowdown in 
global activity early in the 2000s, and now in the aftermath of the credit crunch we see similar 
tendencies in several parts of the world as house prices continue to soar. In a study by Borio 
and McGuire (2004) the authors find that equity price peaks have considerable predictive 
power for subsequent housing price peaks, in a cross-country study for the period 1970-early 
2000s. This indicates perhaps a boom and bust cycle in the housing market that feeds onto 
itself. As opposed to imposing a “natura non facit saltum” condition on housing, one 
generally finds that the housing market instead grows at a slower pace as the economy 
recovers after a recession, or even a downturn in production. The authors also check whether 
this predictive power is somewhat reduced if output growth, unemployment and interest rates 
are included. They find that:  
“…housing price peaks have tended to follow periods of comparatively strong 
economic activity …For example, the coefficients on the lag of GDP growth, while not always 
individually significant when multiple lags are included, indicate that the overall effect is 
positive and statistically significant. Similarly, the effect of unemployment is negative, 
implying that a fall in unemployment in the periods preceding a peak in equity prices leads to 
a higher probability of experiencing a peak in housing prices in the quarters ahead. 
…increases in interest rates were a factor bringing the rise in housing prices to a halt”  
                                 Borio and McGuire (2004) pp. 86 - 87 
They come to the conclusion that the predictive content of this relationship between equity 
and housing is fairly robust to the presence of other macro economic variables as well.  
Housing demand takes up most of the literature on reasons why we have booms and 
bust. Lately, nevertheless, there has been an increasing concern over whether the researchers 
are too narrowly concentrating on the demand side. Clearly, one must understand the supply 
side as well if one wants to determine the reasons for booms and busts in the economy. There 
is a concern that there are too few homes being built where people want to live, and unless 
this is corrected the prices will continue to soar. New government regulation, together with 
new energy requirements launched in July 2010, put heavy restrictions on the standard of new 
homes and this made new homes more costly than with previous regulation.   
 
3.4 Similarities and differences between housing and 
other financial assets 
 
I have already discussed how Norwegian households have a lot of their wealth tied up in 
housing and how some see it as an investment good as well, but how closely related is the 
 housing market to other financial assets, e.g. shares and other equity? What are the similarities 
and differences? These are the questions I wish to address now.   
 
There is a close relationship between equity prices and housing prices. As already noted, 
housing price peaks tend to come after an equity price peak, and also after a beneficial 
economic environment. Traditional economic theory states that both equity and housing are 
somewhat similar long lived assets, in the sense that they both are claims to goods and 
services.  They both have several determinants in common. Both will benefit from 
comparatively strong advantages in economic activity. At the same time they are different in 
several ways. First, real estate is more illiquid than private equity; people generally don’t 
borrow money to invest in shares and bonds and if they do, the leverage ratio is way lower 
than for housing. Second, we cannot always determine if housing is an investment good rather 
than consumption good. There are multiple reasons why people buy homes. Wanting to 
provide a safe environment for their offspring, having more control of their living space and 
financial motives, such as return, are some of them. This mixture leads to problems for the 
financial system because if housing was truly a consumption good, increasing the price should 
then lead to falling demand. As a financial asset, the increase in price actually motions a buy 
now signal. Third, Norwegian houses are not widely traded internationally. Hence, the 
Norwegian consumers cannot realise, in aggregate, their capital gains and increase their 
consumption therein. Fourth, differing economic environments may shift demand for one 
asset in favour of the other. We are here talking about portfolio shifts that drive a wedge 
between this relationship. Lastly, there is no way someone who believes that the housing 
market is overpriced may benefit from this by short-selling the asset and this therefore leads 
to the momentum in the property market. The short-comings of the market to provide a 
possibility for short-selling in the housing market may in fact be leading to the bubbles in the 
housing market.   
 
3.5 Bubbles 
What makes houses such an unsafe asset for the economy? It is perhaps the most dangerous 
asset of all; looking at the absolute size of the asset class. 
“The five big banking blow-ups in the rich world before the latest crisis (Spain in the 
1970s, Norway in the 1980s and Sweden, Finland and Japan in the 1990s) had property at 
their heart.”3        
Houses are the most important single asset of most households, but it is also the backbone of 
the financial intermediaries since the value of real estate is incorporated in their portfolios. In 
                                                 
3
 “A special report on property: Bricks and slaughter.” From the online version of The Economist, 
http://www.economist.com/node/18250385 
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fact, there is a double leverage as both the banks and property are leveraged. House prices are 
in effect not only affecting the business cycle through the financial accelerator, but they also 
influence the performance of the financial sector. It is this interlinkage that determines the 
soundness of the economy.  
 Considering the Norwegian economy, a reasonable question to ask is whether there are 
bubble tendencies in Norway. I will not speculate whether the housing market is experiencing 
a bubble. It is rather difficult to assess whether the price increases are coming from 
underlying economic fundamentals or perhaps irrational exuberance. While western countries 
are experiencing deflating house prices in the aftermath of the financial crisis (Norway and 
Sweden being notable exceptions), eastern countries are essentially still experiencing ever-
increasing house prices, China is a good example of this. The close ties the housing market 
has with the financial sector leads to crises that affect the whole economy, and this boils down 
to an extreme bill that is disproportionately shared among the population and among 
countries. Newspapers in Norway have long been monitoring the developments in the housing 
market. There is a growing concern there is a shortage of houses and that building new homes 
is quite expensive, in fact construction of new homes has not been this low in 100 years, 
pushing the prices further up the sky. We have, nonetheless, seen that construction costs did 
not play a big role in the fourfold increase in house prices from 1995-2010. House prices are 
predicted to increase by another 30% by 2014. Norges Bank has declared it is going to double 
its current policy rate by 2013-14, and although this should in practice lead to lower asset 
prices, the fact remains that higher rates will also lead to lower profitability in the 
construction of new homes, due to higher opportunity cost. Clearly, the market is not learning 
from its own mistakes, and time and again one ends up thinking that “this time it`s different”, 
but it rarely is. And if the market is not going to regulate and fix its own problems, then that 
leaves the government with the unpopular job of pulling the strings. The authorities have 
several ways of giving disincentives towards investing in an already inflated housing market. 
First, institutional changes like altering the tax system towards making housing a less 
attractive investment object. Svein Gjedrem, former governor of Norges Bank, has long been 
a proponent for reforming the taxation of housing to counter credit cycles and achieve a more 
stable housing market; proclaiming that increased taxation of homes, in a similar manner as 
other financial assets, will lead to a dampening effect on housing prices. Second, the mortgage 
financing is a cause for concern. The subprime crisis originated and escalated due to credit 
being to easy at hand, and this drove up the prices creating a bubble that burst. This led to 
falling housing prices, and in some places the housing market is still characterised by great 
scepticism regarding future economic prospects, like USA. There are some drawbacks, 
however, in changing the ease of credit. First-time borrowers and self-employed will suffer 
because of this, and this may lead them to find alternative, and perhaps more expensive, 
financing.  
Third, macroprudential regulation works great in theory, but is rather hard to implement in 
practice. Generally bubbles are known to be a fact only when they burst. These are 
instruments like changing the LTV ratio according to the current cycle, changing the reserve 
requirements and thereby reducing the amount of credit that banks can lend out. Angelini et 
 al. (2011) find that macroprudential policy, like the LTV ratio, contribute little in normal 
times, but have substantial macroeconomic advantages in the case of adverse shocks.  Catte et 
al. (2010) instead ask: 
  “Was US monetary policy too expansionary for too long in the wake of the 2001 
recession? Would a tighter monetary stance have prevented (or at least contained) the 
housing bubble?“         Catte et al. (2010) pp. 6 
They reach the conclusion that regulatory failures, low perceived risk and abundant liquidity 
helped inflate the price bubble prior to the 2003-2007 period. Svenson (2004), conversely, 
takes on a different approach. He claims that asset prices should generally not be the concern 
of the monetary authorities unless they have an impact on target variables, inflation and 
output gap.  
Figure 11 – Different measures normally undertaken in the case of housing price bubbles 
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4 Modelling Housing Spillovers 
 
4.1 Current modelling approaches and monetary 
policy rules 
 
Dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models are micro-founded optimisation models based 
on rational expectations of agents at the micro level. They have, nevertheless, grown in 
popularity in macro economics the last couple of decades and are now widely used in central 
banks. Using a general equilibrium framework, how does one go about incorporating 
borrowing and lending, without losing manageability and comparability with the benchmark 
macro models? Modelling the dynamic optimisation problem for heterogeneous households 
under liquidity constraints without losing the distinctive features of the credit channel, is 
rather complex. And by using a representative agent model we will not even have any lending 
in equilibrium. In other words, we want to incorporate liquidity constraints for heterogeneous 
households in a simplistic model and still be able to generate useful conclusions. When 
studying household savings behaviour many studies have resulted in using an overlapping 
generation’s model to ensure both lending and borrowing occurs in equilibrium. Another 
frequently used model is the separation of the households into two behavioural types. We 
distinguish between a patient and an impatient group; one following a Permanent Income 
hypothesis and one Rule-of-thumb consumer type. This separation makes the model 
significantly simpler without losing the essence of the financial accelerator mechanism.  
 
Aoki et al. (2004) study the interlinkage between the housing market and the general economy 
and postulate whether house prices merely reflect the macroeconomic conditions, or if there 
are indeed important feedback effects from house prices to other economic variables. The 
authors consider two behavioural types of households, homeowners and consumers. The 
homeowners buy houses with private equity and borrow from financial intermediaries, facing 
an external finance premium. The consumers consume goods and housing services. They rent 
housing services from the homeowners and supply their labour to a competitive labour 
market. The producers of the consumption good follow a sticky pricing regime, as is standard 
in the New Keynesian framework. They conclude that an expansionary monetary policy shock 
leads to increased housing demand, increased housing prices and therefore increased net 
worth of homeowners. The increase in net worth reduces the external finance premium and 
this then leads to a further increase in housing demand, and through a spillover effect to 
increased consumption. Aoki et al. (2004) argue further that a deregulated mortgage market 
will to lesser extent have an effect on housing prices, while the effect on consumption will be 
amplified. 
 Iacoviello (2005) setup the model with two key characteristics that define his work; 
collateral constraints, for firms and households, tied to real estate values, and nominal debt. 
Quite like Christensen and Dibs (2008) Iacoviello finds that supply shocks decelerate the 
economy, and demand shocks work the opposite way, amplifying and propagating the shocks. 
He concludes with the notion that there is little to be gained by a monetary authority actively 
seeking to stabilise output and inflation through responding to movements in asset prices, and 
that implementing nominal debt actually improves the output-inflation variance trade-off for 
the central banks since it acts as redistributing wealth between borrowers and lenders.  
Mendicino and Pescatori (2005) try to find a link between the design of an optimal 
monetary policy rule and movements in housing prices. Unlike Iacoviello and Neri (2010) the 
authors direct attention to the welfare of the lenders and the borrowers. Like most other 
authors in this field of research, Mendicino and Pescatori focus on the households` sector 
instead of regarding housing as just another asset in the portfolio of households. In doing so, 
the authors find out how housing prices could be a variable of interest for the interest rate 
setting authority, instead of just looking at general movements in generic asset prices. Ibid. set 
up a simple model with two distinctive household types, a monopolistic competitive good 
producing firm with sticky pricing, and a monetary authority. Mendicino and Pescatori reach 
the conclusion that targeting housing prices for the monetary authority is welfare reducing. 
This result is in contrast to both Iacoviello and Neri (2010), and Faia and Monacelli (2004) in 
a different study.  
Christensen and Dibs (2008) estimate a closed market DSGE model with rigidities 
such as sticky prices, capital adjustment costs and financial frictions. They embed a model 
with these rigidities and show that the financial accelerator improves the model`s fit with the 
data. They find that incorporating a financial accelerator actually reduces the effect on 
investment when considering a supply shock, it amplifies and propagates demand shocks and 
plays an important role in the transmission of monetary shocks. They also find that the same 
effect is rather miniscule on output, but this is mainly due to the monetary authorities reacting 
aggressively to output fluctuations in order to stabilize the economy. They also use a 
representative agent model, and in doing so they focus on the financial accelerator going 
through the balance sheet of firms instead of through housing prices.  
Kannan et al. (2009) start off by asking several questions regarding the role of the 
monetary authority in a model with house price booms. They also ascertain whether the 
central bank should also focus on asset prices as well as CPI and output gap in a similar 
manner as Mendicino and Pescatori, and what I will do in later chapters. It is not always the 
case that the central bank can react to changes in different economic variables; take for 
example a state of high inflation and low economic activity. They therefore also consider the 
use of a macroprudential policy tool alone, or together with the monetary policy tool already 
in use, and its impact on the economy after a shock.  Ibid. use a similar model as in the 
aforementioned papers. They find that when considering a demand shock to the economy, the 
monetary policy tool and a macroprudential policy tool can, and will, help to stabilise the 
economy. They notice that a macroprudential policy tool is unambiguously useful when 
dealing with financial shocks and that even though the monetary policy rule is more 
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aggressive, the volatility in the interest rate is lower as well. When the economy is hit by a 
productivity shock the best policy for the monetary authority is to accommodate the 
improvement in the productivity as much as possible. This is in contrast to the case of a 
demand shock; macroprudential policy tool is unwarranted. 
 Gerali et al. (2010), unlike me and the rest of these authors, incorporate a banking 
sector into the DSGE model. They look at the effects of an expansionary technology shock, 
and a contractionary monetary policy shock. They find that macroeconomic shocks play a 
minor role in explaining the fall in output in 2008 in the Euro area, while the shocks to the 
banking sector explain a lot more. The most important result to be had from their study is that 
much is lost in excluding explicitly financial and credit shocks in DSGE models designed to 
analyse fluctuations in business cycles. 
Iacoviello and Neri (2010) also consider the spillovers from the housing market to the 
wider economy. But they also try to find out what types of shocks are hitting the housing 
market, and how the dynamics of residential investment and housing prices are clarified by 
shocks and frictions in the market. The authors’ model is to some extent similar to those 
above, but instead of a supply side with a manufacturing sector with final- and intermediate 
goods, they model sectoral heterogeneity with a housing and a nonhousing sector. This 
modelling approach yields an additional effect from an increase in house prices, other than the 
traditional effect on borrowing constraints; the relative profitability of producing new homes 
is increased. This addition to the model generates an additional feedback mechanism that 
propagates and amplifies the cycle. Another key feature to this model is that it incorporates 
the collateral effects and that these effects help generate a positive and persistent response of 
consumption following an increase in housing demand. Without this effect the authors state 
that the increase in demand for housing would generate an increase in housing investment and 
housing prices, but a fall in consumption. A monetary shock leads in this model to a drop in 
real house prices, due mainly to nominal stickiness, and that both the collateral effect and 
nominal rigidities amplify the response to consumption. A positive technology shock leads to 
a decline in housing prices due to a rise in investment coming from a fall in construction 
costs.  The main results to note are that technology shocks and housing demand shocks each 
explain about a quarter of the cyclical volatility in the housing investment and housing prices, 
and that the spillovers to the rest of the economy are quite important, but that the effect is 
concentrated on consumption rather than business investment.   
 
4.2 The New Keynesian Dynamic Stochastic General 
Equilibrium Model 
 
I ended up using the model of Matteo Iacoviello (2005), “House Prices, Borrowing 
Constraints, and Monetary Policy in the Business Cycle” from the American Economic 
 review. The model was found in the American Economic review, but the Dynare Code was 
taken from the Macro Model Database, Wieland (2009). There are several similarities to the 
Iacoviello and Neri (2010) as well. While the paper is overly simplistic and stylised, relative 
to several of the other papers I have considered, it still gets the message through. Note that the 
main goal regarding my thesis will not be discovering a brand new model as this is PhD 
material at this level, but mainly estimating and analysing the results of an old one with 
Norwegian data. Hence, I will shortly explain the model I use.   
There are several ways in which economists in this field of research are able to 
generate borrowing and lending within a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium framework, 
and still be able to isolate the desired effects. In order to apply the financial accelerator 
approach to the data one has to identify the different sectors on beforehand and give them 
certain characteristics that are easy to model, and which are expected to yield reasonable 
results. Having a household sector that maximises utility with respect to consumption, holding 
of housing, labour and money balances subject to a budget constraint; one ads a 
microfoundation to a macroeconomic framework. I further make the assumption that 
households are either patient; following a permanent income hypothesis behavioural pattern, 
or impatient; following something similar to a Rule-of-Thumb consumption pattern. 
Incorporating ROT consumers has gained a hold in the literature lately. There will also be an 
entrepreneurial sector and a retail sector, of which is rather standard in these types of New 
Keynesian DSGE models. I further argue that the entrepreneurial sector and the impatient 
type of households are the key element in this model, due to the two sectors facing borrowing 
constraints. Hence, they borrow funds from intermediaries in accordance with their net worth, 
of which depends on the house prices in any given period. In addition to the households, the 
entrepreneurs and the retailers there will also be a central bank following a Taylor type rule.   
 
4.2.1 Households  
The households are infinitely lived, along with the entrepreneurs, and are further divided into 
a patient type and an impatient type. The impatient type is only separated from the patient 
ones through different discount rate; impatient households are assumed to have a higher 
discount rate. The impatient households are hence assumed to be more myopic and face 
borrowing constraints, indicating that they can in fact take advantage of MEW in the case of 
equity price increases, but no other way of borrowing is available for these types. The patient 
households maximize the following utility function 
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balances divided by the price level is given by 
  
 
  
. The household sector is denoted with a 
prime and the impatient households are denoted with a double prime, just like in Iacoviello 
(2005). 
 
The impatient household maximization problem is then, in a similar manner  
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  is the way we denote the housing adjustment cost, but it plays a 
minor role in my further analysis and can therefore be disregarded with ease.  
 
E0 is the expectations operator,            is the discount factor, q is the real housing price 
(Gross price Q divided by price level P), w is the real wage (Gross wage W divided by price 
level P). I further assume that households borrow in real terms –b, and receive back
        
 
  
, 
where      is the nominal interest rate on loans between t-1 and t.   is the difference operator 
in the budget constraint,    
  
    
denotes the gross inflation rate, F denotes the lump sum 
transfers received from the retailers, T -  M/P denotes the net transfers from the central bank 
financed through printing new money. j is the weight one puts on housing services, also the 
demand shock, and   is the labour supply aversion.  
 The housing preference shock may be regarded as a shock that captures other social 
and institutional changes that shift housing preferences, or even cyclical deviations in the 
availability of resources needed to purchase housing, h, relative to other goods, c.   
 Maximizing the utility function, with respect to c, h, L and M/P, subject to the budget 
constraint, one arrives to the first order conditions. In a similar fashion to Iacoviello (2005) I 
will disregard the money demand. Since I use a separable utility function, ignoring the 
quantity of money will not have any consequences for the rest of the model.  
 
4.2.2 Entrepreneurs 
 
Using only labour, capital and real estate as inputs the entrepreneurs produce the intermediate 
good according to a constant returns-to-scale Cobb-Douglas production function: 
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We further make the assumption that the entrepreneur, similar to a consumer, wishes to 
maximize consumption with respect to the borrowing constraint condition, technology, and 
the corresponding budget constraint. 
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Where A is the random technology parameter,      and      are the labour supply of the 
different types of households, α denotes the wage share of the unconstrained agents, and µ 
denotes the capital share in the economy. K is capital and δ is the depreciation rate. ξ denotes 
the adjustment costs for both the sectors, defined as in Iacoviello (2005). m is the loan-to-
value ratio and will in most cases define how much one can borrow, with collateral. I further 
make the assumption that the entrepreneurial discount factor is lower than the patient 
household discount factor, but still as high as the impatient household discount factor. This 
implies for the model I use that the entrepreneurs and the impatient household are in fact 
bounded by the borrowing constraint around the steady state.              in fact makes 
sure that entrepreneurs and borrowing constrained households decumulate wealth quick 
enough to a lower bound such that the borrowing constraint is binding. One complication with 
this model, as Iacoviello notes, is that we want to avoid that the entrepreneurs and the 
impatient households amass wealth and self-insure. In order to get the desired effects of 
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collateral one needs that these ROT consumers hit the borrowing constraints. Iacoviello 
makes good arguments why the probability of this this may be small enough that I disregard 
this nuisance fact.  
 
4.2.3 Retailers 
 
As in most of the models we have covered in this paper, the retail sector is mostly brought 
along in order to introduce price rigidities and monopolistic competition into the model and to 
render the model linear. Price stickiness guarantees that monetary policy has real effects to the 
economy and is introduced through a Calvo-pricing regime. A Calvo price setting rule 
assumes that each firm resets its price only with probability 1-θ in any given period, no matter 
when it last reset its price. In other words, in each period a fraction 1-θ resets its price, while a 
fraction θ keep their prices unchanged. The average duration of a price then becomes 
 
   
 and 
in this context θ is then considered a natural price index of price stickiness. Assuming a 
continuum of retailers and that they purchase intermediate goods from entrepreneurs and 
(inducing the fact that only the retail sector is characterised by monopolistic behaviour) 
differentiate the goods at no extra costs. Their production function, final goods, is given by: 
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And the price index is then given by: 
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Each retailer faces then an individual demand curve derived to be: 
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Adding just another equation to the retail sector one is then able to derive the maximisation 
problem, the price evolution is: 
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θ denotes the staggered price setting à la Calvo (1983). A fraction (1-θ) is allowed to re-
optimise its price in any given period, given by   
 .   
 Firms chose output, prices and labour input in order to maximise expected profits subject to 
the individual demand curves, production technology function and the different Calvo-states. 
Setting up the Lagrangian and deriving the first order conditions with respect to   prices, 
output and labour input and we get the following condition: 
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 ) is the relevant discount, and   
 
   
 is the markup of final goods 
over intermediate goods in steady state. Assuming zero inflation in steady state and log-
linearizing we get the New Keynesian forward looking Phillips Curve (NKPC). The forward 
looking Phillips Curve postulates that inflation depends positively on expected inflation and 
negatively on the markup.  
 
4.2.4 The central bank  
The central bank in this model is assumed to follow a backward looking interest rate rule, 
according to a Taylor principle. The Taylor principle states that the central bank reacts to 
inflation shock more than one-to-one in order to affect the real interest rate.  
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Where I denote rr and Y as steady state values of real rate and output, just as in Iacoviello 
(2005).      is the inflation shock, or white noise shock process that is identically and 
independently distributed with variance   
  and zero mean.  
 
4.2.5 Equilibrium 
The first order conditions obtained from the households’ maximisation problem, firm 
maximisation problem, as well as the central bank interest rate rule, make up the DSGE model 
in a stylised manner. The equilibrium model is derived using market clearing conditions in the 
housing market, labour market, real estate, goods market and market for loans. Log-
linearizing the complete model around a steady state in order to reduce the computational 
difficulty for the system of equations that need to be solved simultaneously is a frequently 
used method in DSGE macro models. This method of transforming non-linear equations into 
linear in terms of log-deviation of the related variables from their steady state values is 
intensely used in macroeconomics, as well as microeconomics. For small enough deviations 
from steady state we interpret the log-deviations as percentage deviations from steady state, 
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hence the “hat” in the following model. The complete log-linearized model is as follows, 
taken directly from Iacoviello (2005), Appendix A page 760-761:  
Aggregate demand 
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               ) 
The first equation is the clearing condition in the goods market, while the second equation is 
the first order condition (FOC) for the patient households. The last equation defines the 
investment. 
 
Housing/consumption margin 
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The first equation here denotes the optimal condition for entrepreneurs, the second the 
optimality condition for impatient household and the last one the non-myopic households 
demand. 
Borrowing constraints for the firm and the households 
                                                                 
  
 
Aggregate supply 
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Here we have the log-linearized production function with the market clearing condition 
already incorporated, together with the Phillips curve.  
 
 
Budget constraint and capital evolution process 
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In the first equation here we clearly see how the capital evolves over time, the Law of motion 
equation for capital, along with the forces at work regarding the net worth of both firms and 
households.  
 
Monetary policy rule and stochastic AR(1) processes 
           )     )               )                          
                         
                        
                        
 
The first stochastic Ar(1) process denotes the demand shock, (or preference shock), the 
second on denotes the cost-push shock and the last one the technology shock, (or supply 
shock).  
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Where                       is the real ex ante interest rate.   
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  and noticing that    
       )    
 
  and     
    )      )
 
  in the log-linearized equation, where they denote the 
income share of the patient and impatient households, respectively. Iacoviello (2005) defines 
       )     as the average discount factor for the returns to entrepreneurial real 
estate investment.   
 5 Quantitative Policy Analyses and 
Estimation 
 
5.1 Methodology and data 
 
I will use a Bayesian New Keynesian Synthesis (NNS) estimation approach and choose both 
calibrated parameters and appropriate prior distributions for the parameters that I estimate.  
 
“Bayesian NNS models, therefore, combine a sound, microfounded structure suitable 
for policy analysis with a good probalistic description of the observed data and good 
forecasting performance”     Smets and Wouters (2007)  pp. 587 
 
The likelihood function is assessed using a Kalman filter. The posterior distributions are then 
done using a Metropolis Hastings algorithm, within the free software Dynare4.2.0 along with 
Matlab version R2010b, to draw the posterior distribution of the parameters. I estimate the 
model using four observable variables; GDP in fixed prices, CPI adjusted for taxes and energy 
prices (hereafter CPI-ATE), nominal house prices deflated by the CPI-ATE and the 3 Month 
NIBOR for the period 1995Q1 – 2010Q4. For the period I wish to examine I have come to the 
conclusion that GDP and real house prices will most likely have a trend, inflation and NIBOR 
are assumed to be without a trend and are therefore not filtered. They are, nonetheless, 
demeaned. Hence, both real GDP and real house prices have been detrended using a Hodrick-
Prescott filter (HP) after first having been recalculated to log values. More on this in the 
Appendix.  
 
After doing this I intend to go on to do some comparative analysis through showing the 
impulse responses to different shocks to real GDP, nominal interest rates, real house prices, 
inflation and consumption. Using the baseline model as a benchmark I will then plot the 
impulse responses with no collateral effects for constrained households (m = m’’= 0).  Doing 
so, I can estimate the spillovers from the housing market to consumption. I intend to measure 
the spillovers to the general economy through the notion that the conventional wealth effect 
on consumption is greater when collateral effects are indeed present. Also, another large part 
of the spillovers come from the notion of the wage share of the constrained households. These 
are the financial frictions mentioned in the beginning of my thesis. I will also check what 
would happen if the central bank, in addition to reacting to last period nominal interest rates, 
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activity in the economy and last period inflation, keep an eye on current asset prices as well. 
The reason is that asset prices that are let to overinflate will have large repercussions for the 
economy. In this manner, one can check whether it would be beneficial for a central bank to 
implementing asset prices into the monetary policy rule.  The limited gains of asset prices in 
the policy specification are already noted in the literature. I will elaborate on this on a later.   
5.2 Calibrated parameters 
 
One important reason why we often calibrate certain parameters is that some parameters are 
known to be hard to pin-point and therefore hard to estimate, or that other papers have already 
identified the relevant value of the parameters in question. Calibration necessitates that the 
values of the parameters are collected from other sources independent of the phenomenon 
under study.  
“This controversial step is driven by three main concerns. First, identification of deep 
parameters in estimated large dynamic systems can be troublesome. Second, there is often a 
conceptual mismatch between the theoretical variables and their sample counterparts. …And 
third, in practice the classical estimation of macro models can be plagued by badly-behaved 
likelihoods – the researcher typically has very few business cycle fluctuations with which to 
estimate the highly abstract model.”      Karagedikli et al. (2008) pp. 10  
 
The parameters that I chose to calibrate for the Norwegian data are also the ones that are most 
commonly calibrated, such as the discount rate for the different types of households, capital 
share and wage share of the economy, depreciation rate of capital and mark-up of final- over 
intermediate goods and LTV ratios. 
 Table 1 – Parameter calibration 
Parameter Description Value 
β Discount factor for patient household 0.9994 
β’’ Discount factor for impatient household 0.97 
γ Discount factor for entrepreneurial sector 0.97 
m’’ Loan-to-value ratio for households 0.8 
m Loan-to-value ratio for entrepreneurs 0.35 
j Weight on housing services 0.2 
η Labour supply aversion 1.01 
ν Housing share 0.03 
Ψ Variable capital adjustment cost 2 
δ Variable capital depreciation rate 0.0180 
   Housing adjustment cost, entrepreneurs 0 
   Housing adjustment cost, impatient HH 0 
 The parameters that I have calibrated are given on Table 2, with their corresponding value. 
Most of the time these calibrated values will be close to or taken directly from US or 
European studies on the literature. I have, nonetheless, also used Norwegian studies where 
this was possible. I further make the assumption that using estimates from literature on the 
subject based on American or European studies will not have significant impact on my 
estimation procedure and my estimation results. I calibrate β to be 0.9994 based on a 
Norwegian study by Bache et al. (2010), implying an annual steady state real return on 
financial assets of about 0.25%. This seems rather intuitive since Norwegian consumers have 
a higher savings ratio than their American counterparts in Iacoviello`s study. The impatient 
households discount factor, β’’, is calibrated to 0.97 just as in Iacoviello and Neri (2010) and 
this will enable the ROT consumers to hit the borrowing constraints. Iacoviello (2005) sets γ 
to be 0.97 as it proxies for the internal rate of return for the firms. Considering that Norwegian 
firms have higher wage costs and lower productivity than their American counterparts, I have 
reason to believe this to be different from the one Iacoviello uses. In a working paper 
estimating a DSGE model for the Euro area with a data set from ECB, Gerali et al. (2010) 
calibrate this value to 0.97, similar to the impatient households discount factor. Lacking 
Norwegian estimates on the subject I will, nevertheless, stick with these authors choice here 
as well. The LTV parameter is calibrated to be 0.8 for Norway based on a cross country study 
by Tasatsaronis and Zhu (2004). I calibrate the entrepreneurial LTV ratio to 0.35, following 
Gerali et al. (2010). This implies that non-residential property is more easily collaterisable 
than residential property. I believe this parameter does not differ a lot from Norway and, 
hence, will calibrate the same value for the LTV. These calibrated values of the LTV ratios 
are meant to measure the typical credit constrained borrowers LTV ratios and define the 
maximum possible amount they can borrow against their home/collateral.  The weight on the 
housing services is set to 0.2 as in Gerali et al. (2010); Norwegian consumers are by 
assumption putting no more weight on housing services than their European counterparts.  δ is 
calibrated to 0.0180 in accordance with the capital depreciation rate for Norwegian data in 
Bache et al. (2009), implying a quarterly depreciation rate of capital of 1.8%.  
η, ψ, φ and ν are the parameters that I will be following Iacoviello (2005) on as well and 
calibrate them to 1.01, 2, 0 and 0.03, respectively. This is due to the complication of 
estimating these parameters in my relatively stylised model.  
 
5.3 Bayesian estimation  
 
In the Bayesian framework the parameters are considered random variables and hence the 
objective is to make conditional probalistic statements about the parameters. Conditional on 
the structure of the model, observed data and the prior distribution specified for the 
parameters. The first two are then used to form a likelihood function; the result is then, along 
with the prior distribution, used to get the associated posterior distribution using Bayes` Rule.  
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In these types of models, New Keynesian DSGE-models, one often ends up estimating key 
parameters using prior information, which is a clever way of avoiding the calibration 
problems number one and three from above. Here the priors will act as a catch-all for 
information that is not in the sample data. One might even argue that the calibration method is 
an extreme variant of Bayesian procedure since we focus on one single value of the 
parameter. Using such a strong prior, the observations of the data series add nothing to our 
knowledge of the parameter values and the posterior density overlaps with the prior one. 
“While, in principle, priors can be gleaned from personal introspection to reflect 
strongly held beliefs about the validity of economic theories, in practice most priors are 
chosen based on some observations.”    An and Schorfheide (2007) pp. 127
       
The main advantages of using priors; using all the relevant information from past studies and 
estimations makes sense since it makes the model and estimation more robust than it would 
have been for a single sample, and it makes sure that less new testing is needed to confirm 
confidence intervals when priors are encouraging. There are of course drawbacks to using 
priors; prior information may in some cases not be accurate and this will lead to misleading 
conclusions and results; for example if priors are from models with different characteristics 
and cannot be compared as such, and the results are not in any way objective since they 
represent the researchers subjective opinion on the choice of prior. The priors express the 
researcher’s opinion about the likely value of the parameter in question. And by using Bayes 
formula one derives the posterior probability of the value of the parameter, revising the 
starting assessment. One might say that the posterior density summarises what we know about 
a parameter after observing the data. And since we are considering structural parameters, it is 
also the basis for probalistic statements about them. In Dynare this is done using Kalman 
Filter to find numerical values that maximise the prior and the sum of the likelihood. It is, 
nonetheless, important to notice that the posterior of one parameter is dependent of the priors 
of all the other parameters; changing one prior will change the rest of the estimated posterior 
distributions as well. Specifying a prior necessitates a lot of other information, and it may as 
such be difficult doing so. This is because one does not only specify the mean value of the 
parameter one expects the parameter to have, but also the distribution of the prior and the 
standard deviation. Avoiding the headache that is choosing a prior and prior distribution one 
can use un-informative priors, using rather vague information, but this is to say that one 
misrepresents one`s knowledge about a parameter.  
Following the convention of recent papers estimating similar DSGE models using prior 
information; I will use the inverse gamma distribution for parameter values that need to be 
constrained by the zero lower bound and are relatively small in value (mostly reserved for the 
distribution of the standard deviation of the shocks), beta distribution for parameters that are 
restricted between zero and one, gamma distribution for parameters restricted to be positive, 
normal distribution for values of other dimensions.  
 
 Figure 12 – Prior distributions of some of the parameters. 
 
5.3.1 Prior distribution 
The priors I have chosen for the estimation are given in table 3. These are overall in the same 
range as previous studies. As for the monetary policy specification, I chose priors conveying 
different weight on inflation deviations, (output deviations) and interest rate according to a 
Taylor rule.  I have assumed prior means, based on the posteriors of a Norwegian DSGE 
study, Bache et al. (2010), prior means for the policy weight parameters of 0.67, 1.5 and 0.45 
were used for              , respectively. These are almost identical to the Gerali et al. study 
on European soil. Note, however, that Bache et al. (2010) consider an open economy, and also 
incorporate exchange rate. The patient household wage share prior mean is set to 0.65 with a 
standard error of 0.05, as in Iacoviello and Neri (2010). Bache et al. (2010) calibrate capital 
share to be 0.3, I chose their value as prior mean along with a standard error of 0.02. θ, the 
staggered price setting parameter is set 0.75 with a beta distribution, implying that retailers re-
optimise their price every 4 quarters. Choosing this value from a US study, I believe, will not 
stultify the posterior distribution of the parameter. The steady state mark-up is set to be 5% in 
Iacoviello (2005) and a 15% mark-up is assumed in Iacoviello and Neri (2010), I have, 
nevertheless, reason to believe there to be a lesser degree of competition in Norway, so this 
might just be higher for Norwegian data. Setting it to be in the ballpark of these estimates, I 
set prior mean of the mark-up, X, to 1.20. Prior mean of 0.8 has been chosen for the AR (1) 
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coefficients with a standard error 0.1, implying a great degree of persistence in the shocks, 
following Iacoviello and Neri (2010). The standard deviations of the shocks are set to 0.01 
with a standard deviation of 0.05 as in the model of Gerali et al. (2010).  
 
5.3.2 Posterior distribution 
Now that I have used frequently calibrated parameters and estimated other parameters such as 
patient household wage share, capital share, Calvo parameter and monetary policy 
parameters, using Bayesian estimation, I will go on to discuss whether my estimation results 
are reasonable prima facie.  The posteriors are estimated with 20 000 Metropolis Hastings 
draws, yielding an almost ideal acception rate of 0.248 (25% being ideal).   
Table 3 also displays the posterior mean and the 95% probability intervals for the parameters. 
I find a wage share of about 0.73 for unconstrained agents for the Norwegian economy, 
implying that the constrained agents wage share is about 0.27. Overall this is above the prior 
mean that is set to 0.65. If this value is large enough that it yields the desired results that the 
elasticity of consumption with respect to house prices for constrained agents is positive and 
large enough stands to see. Capitals share in the Cobb-Douglas production function is 
estimated to 0.31 which is satisfyingly close to the prior mean. This means that the labour 
income share in this model of Norwegian economy is about 69%. My estimate for the 
staggered price setting parameter implies that firms re-optimise their price on average almost 
every year. The mark-up of final goods over intermediate goods is estimated to 1.21, which 
says that the estimated mark-up is about 21%. As for the policy parameters, the importance 
assigned to output deviation, inflation deviation and interest rate smoothing are what should 
be expected for an inflation targeting central bank. These estimates imply that the central bank 
allots a lot of importance towards keeping inflation stable, although less than prior mean 
suggests. Relatively less importance is assigned to output stabilisation, while interest rate 
smoothing is assigned more stressed than the interest rate smoothing coefficient imply. Bache 
et al. (2010) estimated these parameters to 1.5, 0.67 and 0.45, respectively. We see that my 
estimates, although not directly comparable since we use different models (open versus closed 
economy) and different data, are somewhat close to their estimates. Their estimates suggest 
that the central bank stresses inflation deviations more than my estimates would imply. They 
also find that less importance is assigned to interest rate smoothing and output stabilisation 
than my estimates suggest. This is in line with the inflation targeting regime that the 
Norwegian central bank accords to, as one of few central banks with an explicit inflation 
target. This explicit inflation target Norges bank adheres to is set at 2.5% over time. The 
AR(1) persistence parameters are quite high, implying a high degree of pass-through to the 
next period. The autoregressive demand shock coefficient is estimated to almost 0.95, 
indicating a great degree of persistence. The cost-push shock is estimated to almost unity, 
meaning an almost complete pass-through of the shock to the next period. In other words, 
these shocks are extremely persistent. The technology shock AR(1) persistence parameter is 
estimated to about 0.75, implying that about three quarter of the shock is passed over to the 
 next period. These are not in contradiction to the ones Gerali et al. (2010) estimate for 
European data, Iacoviello and Neri (2010) estimates on US data, and also around the prior 
means of Bache et al. (2009) on Norwegian data. The standard deviations of the shock are 
reasonably low, as is also the case in Iacoviello (2010) paper.   
 
Table 2 - Prior and Posterior distribution of the parameters 
Description Parameter Prior 
distribution 
Prior 
mean 
Prior 
se. 
Posterior 
mean 
95% 
Confidence 
interval 
Factor shares, LTV ratios and other deep parameters 
       
Unconstrained 
agents wage share 
α Beta 0.65 0.05 0.7318 0.67 – 0.80 
Variable capital 
share 
μ Beta 0.3 0.02 0.3086 0.27 – 0.34 
Calvo-parameter θ Beta 0.75 0.05 0.7500 0.66 – 0.83 
Mark-up X Gamma 1.2 0.1 1.2096 1.04 – 1.36 
Interest rate 
smoothing – CB`s 
own lag 
   Beta 0.67 0.1 0.9129 0.89 – 0.93 
Output deviations
    Gamma 0.45 0.1 0.6315 0.51 – 0.75 
Inflation deviation    Gamma 1.5 0.1 1.3603 1.21 – 1.50 
Reaction to asset 
prices***
 
   Normal 0.15 0.1 0.0338 0.00 – 0.07 
       
AR(1) coefficients       
       
Cost-push    Beta 0.8 0.1 0.9769 0.96 – 0.99 
Demand    Beta 0.8 0.1 0.9491 0.92 – 0.98 
Supply /tech. shock    Beta 0.8 0.1 0.7500 0.69 – 0.81 
       
St.d. of shocks       
       
Cost-push    Inv. 
gamma 
0.01 0.05 0.0019   0.0015 – 0.0023 
Demand    Inv. 
gamma 
0.01 0.05 0.5817 0.43 – 0.72 
Supply –tech. shock    Inv. 
gamma 
0.01 0.05 0.0457 0.04 – 0.05 
Interest rate shock    Inv. 
gamma 
0.01 0.05 0.0018   0.0016 – 0.0021 
***
 Was estimated separately as the rest of the estimates above. Prior means for the policy weight parameters of 0.67,  1.5 
0.45 and 0.15 were used for                  respectively.  
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The following graph depicts my prior density (grey curve), the estimated posterior density 
(black curve), and the green vertical line depicts the posterior value for the different 
parameters. As we see from the graph the distributions of the prior differ at times from the 
posterior estimates, but overall the prior distribution coincides with the posterior distribution.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13 – Posterior distribution along with prior distribution. Black line depicts posterior 
distributions, grey depicts prior distributions and green depicts the posterior mean. 
 
 
 5.4 Properties of the estimated DSGE model 
Table 3 - Correlation matrix of the simulated variables 
Variable Yhat Rhat qhat pihat chat c’’hat 
Yhat 1.0000 -0.9919 0.9609 -0.8725 0.9791 0.8695 
Rhat -0.9919 1.0000 -0.9661 0.9241 -0.9818 -0.8114 
qhat 0.9609 -0.9661 1.0000 -0.8506 0.9180 0.7323 
pihat -0.8725 0.9241 -0.8506 1.0000 -0.8993 -0.6158 
chat 0.9791 -0.9818 0.9180 -0.8993 1.0000 0.8259 
c’’hat 0.8695 -0.8114 0.7323 -0.6158 0.8259 1.0000 
 
The correlation matrix of the simulated variables indicates that there is a large positive 
correlation between the consumption of the entrepreneurial sector (chat) and house prices of 
0.92, as well as a positive correlation between constrained household consumption (c2hat) 
and residential prices of the magnitude 0.73.  I also find that real house prices are almost 
positively correlated with real GDP, but a strong negative correlation between real house 
prices and inflation rate. These results are similar to the ones obtained by Ahearne et al. 
(2005), although they find that real house prices are co-moving with inflation as well. Also, 
when assigning m’’ and m a value of 0, i.e. no collateral constraint, we see that the correlation 
between real house prices and impatient household consumption is increased to 0.89, 
implying a larger correlation between them. For the entrepreneurial consumption, this 
correlation is slightly reduced. The correlation matrix to this simulated scenario is given in the 
Appendix C.  
In the following graphs, figure 14 and 15, depicting smoothed variables, we see how 
the data portrays the quarter to quarter changes. We see that the house prices move strongly 
with output and that it lags the cycle slightly. When GDP is above trend then so are the real 
house prices. Real house prices are on the other hand a lot more volatile than the real GDP. 
Norway experienced a great economic boom in the period of 2003-2007. The low interest 
rates made sure that people were able and could afford to buy new houses or upgrade to a 
better one, leading to increased demand and, since supply is very inelastic in the short to 
medium run, increased house prices. After about 50 quarters we see that real house prices start 
their strong descent and drop to more than 0.08% below trend.  This fall may largely be 
explained by the gradual increase in the policy rate from 1.75 in mid 2005 to 5.75 in the fall 
of 2008 along with increased scepticism regarding future prospects.   
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Figure 14 – Percentage deviations from steady state for the period 1995Q1 – 2010Q4.  
Figure 15 – Fluctuations around trend shown in the data for 1995Q1-2010Q4. Real GDP and real house 
prices have been detrended and are in their log-values. CPI is normalised to its 1999 value and demeaned. 
Nominal interest is also demeaned. 
 
 The impulse response functions of the estimated model are next on the list. I show the 
impulse responses of a contractionary monetary policy shock, a positive demand shock, a 
positive supply shock (technology shock) and an inflation surprise (cost-push shock). I also 
introduce a second curve in the same graphs incorporating a no-collateral constraint 
(m=m’’=0). The reason why I do this is because one easy, and perhaps simplistic way, of 
showing the spillovers of house prices to consumption is to show the reinforced effects when 
there are collateral effects present. Increased house prices should therefore in my model lead 
to more consumption when households are able to withdraw more equity from their home, up 
to a LTV ratio of unity. This effect is perhaps strongest when considering monetary policy 
shocks. The credit channel effect of house prices on consumption is present only when we 
consider monetary and real shocks to the economy. The monetary policy shock is therefore 
my main concern; although I will, briefly, explain the other impulse responses as well. The 
impulse responses for 20 quarters are simulated using estimated parameters and calibrated 
parameters, yielding the following results: 
 
Monetary shock. – A contractionary monetary policy shock to the economy, shown as the 
initial increase in nominal interest rate, leads initially to a fall in real GDP.  
Figure 16 – Impulse responses to an iid. monetary policy shock. 
 
Real GDP declines due to the shock, but moves towards the steady state within 5 quarters. 
The situation is quite similar when there are no collateral effects.  Real house prices initially 
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drop and hence worsen the cycle, as is reasonable due to fewer agents wishing to buy homes 
when the cost of financing increases, but it then overshoots the steady state after the economic 
recovery. In the no collateral effects case, real house prices display a bigger initial drop and it 
stabilises after around 5 quarters. The drop in real house prices is quite intuitive since asset 
prices generally decrease when interest rates increase. Overall on consumption, we see that 
the constrained households’ reaction to the policy shock shows a smaller initial drop in 
consumption, compared to the case when collateral effects are present. The effects are as 
follows: Increased interest rates reduce asset prices and affect the borrowing constraints 
negatively. Increased LTV ratio and the effect on the borrowing constraint lead to lower 
borrowing opportunities for these households. We clearly see an amplification mechanism in 
the case of a negative monetary shock.  
 
Housing preference shock. – A positive nominal demand shock to the economy is shown as 
a small initial drop in GDP in both scenarios. Normally a demand shock leads to an increase 
in activity, in my model; however, I have the opposite effect, although it is rather small. This 
is the same result as Iacoviello (2005) finds for US data.  
Figure 17 – Impulse responses to preference shock. Black curve is the baseline model, blue curve 
depicts when LTV ratios are set to 0. 
 
A housing preference shock leads to a negative, albeit small, response of aggregate demand. 
From above we remember that a housing preference shock may also be regarded as a 
measurement of cyclical deviations of the availability of resources needed to purchase 
 housing and institutional changes that affect housing demand. This is not directly comparable 
to a demand shock to output in different models, hence output falls and real house prices 
increase initially. Inflation falls initially, leading the central bank to react by reducing the 
policy rate. The lower policy rates lead to increased demand and consumption, as is shown in 
the graph. Real house prices increase initially and move towards the steady state after a while, 
displaying a hump-shaped pattern. In the case of no collateral effects, the effect is greater on 
house prices and marginally greater on consumption. Most of the time the two scenarios co-
align with each other and there is no clear financial accelerator effect in play here.    
 
Technology shock. – The positive technology shock to the economy has real effects, as we 
see on the real GDP. Real GDP displays a positive hump-shaped pattern after a couple 
quarters in both of the scenarios. Unlike the case of a demand shock, a supply shock generates 
a trade-off for the central bank.  
Figure 18 – Impulse responses to a positive technology (supply) shock. Black curve is the baseline 
model, blue curve depicts when LTV ratios are set to 0. 
The positive technology shock leads to increased activity in the economy as well as deflation. 
Notice that the favourable technology shock is partly accommodated by the central bank, as 
the interest rate is decreased. The nominal interest rate should increase in order to dampen the 
supply shock on GDP, but it should decrease in order to increase inflation. We see, however, 
that it is reduced and should, according to a Taylor rule, imply that the policy rate is reduced 
more than the inflation in order to reduce the real interest rate. This is because the central 
bank is by assumption not frantically concerned with small output deviations. Instead we see 
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that as the inflation rate starts its climb back towards steady state, the central bank increases 
the interest rate accordingly. The consumption of the constrained households displays a 
greater negative effect when there are collateral effects in play. This is in contrast to a 
monetary shock, as shown above. And as is already noted in Iacoviello (2005) for US data, I 
find for Norwegian data that a technology shock decelerates the economy.  
Cost-push shock. – An inflation surprise is captured by the positive initial effect on real 
GDP, house prices, and as expected, a positive effect on inflation as well. The inflation 
pressure in the economy leads to a monetary tightening. As noted above, Tsatsaronis and Zhu 
found that inflation is the main driver of house prices. Since households are assumed to hedge 
against rising inflation with housing and due to inflation being regarded as a proxy for 
financial condition, we clearly see that rising inflation leads to reduced real house prices, in a 
hump-shaped pattern. The authors also argued that in the short run almost 90% of the 
variation in house prices may be due to inflation. There is a good reason why they are 
correlated indeed, seeing that a form of house prices/renting prices is incorporated in the CPI. 
The impulse response functions clearly show this effect in play. The collateral case here 
almost aligns with the no-collateral constraint scenario, except housing prices and 
consumption. We also see a clear difference between the collateral and the no-collateral effect 
case. Collateral effects lead to increased effect on consumption, displaying the spillovers of 
increased house prices. 
Figure 19 – Impulse responses to cost-push shock. Black curve is the baseline model, blue curve depicts 
when LTV ratios are set to 0. 
 Higher wage share of the constrained individuals –As explained above, the fraction of 
constrained to unconstrained agents in the economy matters a lot. Increasing the fraction of 
ROT consumers should, in theory, lead to increased effect of monetary policy shocks on asset 
prices, and therefore on consumption. The intuition is as follows: an unanticipated negative 
monetary shock to the economy leads to increased house prices  improving the financial 
position for the consumer  reduced LTV ratio  increased borrowing on the face value of 
the home  increase in consumption. Developments that increase the fraction of constrained 
to unconstrained households should therefore amplify this effect. ROT consumers are by 
definition consuming their entire income every period, they should in theory react more 
strongly to changes in house prices than their more patient counterparts. Reducing the wage 
share of the unconstrained agents, decreasing α, should proxy for more ROT consumers as 
well as a case of restricting the ease of credit unrelated to housing. I reduce α from 0.73 to 0.2 
and analyse the impulse responses to a negative monetary policy shock.  
Figure 20 – Impulse responses for different scenarios. Separated the effect of a small monetary policy 
shock in the baseline scenario (Black curve), reduced constrained household wage share (Green curve) and no-
collateral effects (Blue curve). 
 
I obtained similar results as Aoki et al. (2001) in their Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin. 
Note, however, that they consider instead a reduction in the wage share of ROT consumers. 
An unanticipated monetary tightening leads to an initial reduction in house prices. This 
worsens the financial position of the borrowers through increased LTV ratio and therefore 
reduces their consumption as well. Since impatient households react more strongly to changes 
in their current income, increased wage share of ROT consumers will therefore lead to an 
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increased effect on aggregate demand, as shown in the real GDP graph. Aggregate effect on 
consumption is not shown as consumption in this model is separated into three different 
segments; entrepreneurial consumption, PIH type consumption and ROT consumption. As we 
see from figure 20, the effect of increased ROT consumers leads to a much larger initial effect 
on real house prices, and therefore a larger effect on inflation as well (not shown in the 
graph). Clearly, the wage share of the consumers also displays an amplification mechanism 
that leads to increased consumption for constrained agents when compared to the case of no 
collateral effect. Comparing reduced alpha to the baseline case (black curve) we see that the 
effect on ROT consumption is smaller. This may be due to the dual identity of alpha; proxies 
for number of ROT consumers as well as the case of restricting the ease of credit unrelated to 
housing. In the recent years we have, nonetheless, seen quite a different trend. While I look at 
what happens when the number of ROT consumers increase, the developments in Norway are 
rather conflicting. First, average maturing time for mortgage debt has increased from 15 to 23 
years during the last decade. Second, the size of the mortgage does not matter as much 
anymore; instead a more common practice for banks is to look at the capability of agents in 
servicing and taking on new debt. The increased popularity of the no-annuity period in has 
also contributed on this matter.  Opposing these effects are the stricter guidelines from the 
Financial Supervisory Authority for Norway, requiring additional collateral for loans with 
exceeding 90% LTV ratio.     
Also note that the correlation between ROT consumers’ consumption and real house prices 
turns negative and near zero after lowering α from 0.73 to 0.2 (Appendix C). A negative, 
although small, correlation implies that as one variable goes up the other goes down. Perhaps 
counter intuitively, this says that an increase in the house prices from steady state is 
accompanied by reduced consumption for ROT consumers when the fraction of ROT 
consumers increases.  
 
5.5 Central bank reacting to house prices 
 
I now turn my attention to the central bank and their role. In this section I intend to add house 
prices to the reaction function of the central banks to see if and how monetary policy is 
affected by this. I check weather introducing a central bank reaction towards asset price 
stabilisation leads to higher volatility in output and inflation in this model. The central bank 
will now focus on large variations in asset prices (residential and non-residential prices in this 
model), last period’s inflation, output deviations and interest rate smoothing. The following 
interest rate rule is implemented in the Dynare4.2.0 estimation procedure: 
 
                     )(             )                  )          
  
Note, nonetheless, that I will use the same priors for both types of monetary policy choice 
functions. In doing so I follow the lead of Bache et al. (2010) in their study: “This is meant to 
reflect the heroic assumption that these parameters are truly structural.” 
There is a large literature of researchers including asset prices in their respective 
policy specification. A thorough insight into the literature will go beyond the scope of this 
thesis, I will, however, briefly go through some main results. As noted above, Iacoviello 
(2005) finds that there are gains in targeting asset prices in terms of output and inflation 
stabilisation. He argues for a positive weight on asset price deviations,   , around 0.1-0.15, 
although his results are not statistically significant. Mendicino and Pescatori (2005) also 
arrive to the same conclusion in their stylised DSGE model. Svenson (2004) reasons in a 
similar manner as the authors above, claiming (in a briefing paper for the ECB governor) that 
central banks should not include asset prices in their policy rule in normal times. In normal 
times it is up to the supervisory authorities to monitor the market for indicators of financial 
instability and report well ahead with appropriate regulatory and supervisory action. This is a 
benefit as a whole because it only applies in times of crisis or great instability. Financial 
stability becomes then a constraint only when expansionary monetary policy is required, 
affecting monetary policy only in gloomy times. He goes on to discuss the limited amount of 
information the central bank has prior to excessive asset price surges and the hardship in 
identifying the consequences of bubbles bursting. Pre-emptive action to moderate asset price 
movements, therefore, will not be usable in practice, ibid.: “Furthermore, whereas the 
principles for good monetary policy are simple, the practice of good monetary policy is 
difficult.” 
 Faia and Monacelli (2007) instead find (perhaps counter intuitively) that the monetary 
authorities should respond to increased asset prices by lowering the interest rate. The intuition 
behind their finding is that the asset price is analogous to a tax that distorts the dynamic 
evolution for investment. A central bank with a stark distaste for inflation will, though, not 
experience any welfare gains in targeting asset prices. Only those with a specific Taylor type 
rule with coefficient on inflation ranging between 1 and 2 experience a gain in welfare. This is 
however not different from what is found in central banks around the world, as well as 
Norway. This is illustrated in their 3D graph, figure 21, depicting welfare, inflation and asset 
prices. When the coefficient of inflation deviation is low, then there are gains in reacting to 
asset prices.  
 
Estimating the model with the asset prices, I found, led several of the other parameters t-
statistics to decrease in magnitude.    obtained a low t-value (0.21), implying statistical 
insignificance just like Iacoviello (2005) in his US study. Most of the posteriors remained 
around their prior means, while the standard deviation of the shocks did in fact increase 
slightly in magnitude. The policy coefficients were estimated to 0.91, 0.67, 1.38 and 0.03 for 
               , respectively. These indicate that interest rate smoothing is actively sought 
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out for the monetary policy authorities, although less importance is assigned to output 
deviations interest smoothing than for. A great deal of importance is also assigned to inflation 
stabilisation, which is to be expected as the central bank is still considered following a 
flexible inflation targeting regime. A flexible inflation targeting regime implies that the 
central bank aims to keep inflation low and stable, yet still assigning weight to output 
deviations. It is assumed to partly accommodate inflationary pressures in the short run in 
order to avoid excessive instability of output and unemployment.  
 
I illustrate the impulse responses to three cases of monetary policy specification. One where 
   is set to zero, one where    is set to the estimated value of 0.0348 and one in which I use 
the one Iacoviello (2005) suggests in his study, namely 0.15.  
We see from the impulse response functions that a monetary tightening leads to no 
significant effect on the impulse responses. The impulse responses of the cost-push shock and 
the technology shock are given in appendix C, as they reveal the same pattern. The situation is 
slightly different when considering a shock to technology, however. These impulse responses 
are illustrated in figure 22 and 23, respectively.  
Figure 22 – Impulse responses to a negative monetary policy shock. Black curve depicts the case when 
rq=0, blue curve when rq=0.03 (estimated value) and green curve when rq=0.15 (as implied by Iacoviello 
(2005)). 
 
Reacting to asset prices, here residential and non-residential prices, leads to greater effect on 
output, consumption and inflation. My simulation results reveal that the variance of aggregate 
output does decrease slightly from reacting to asset prices, but the variance of the inflation 
 rate is instead increased marginally as well. If these changes are statistically different remains 
unknown in this thesis.    
      Figure 23 – Impulse responses to a positive technology shock. Black curve depicts the case when rq=0, blue 
curve when rq=0.04 (estimated value) and green curve when rq=0.15 (implied by Iacoviello (2005)). 
 
This was a rather simplistic way of analysing the effects of incorporating asset prices 
into the policy function. I arrive to the similar result as Iacoviello (2005), in that introducing 
asset prices into the policy specification is statistically insignificant at the 1%, 5% as well as 
the 10% significance level.   
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6 Limitations and Areas of Further 
Research 
 
I started off with a plan of incorporating an open economy model for Norway, of which is an 
economy that is heavily affected by the developments from the rest of the world. The 
financial market is starkly interlinked with the rest of the world as well. The size of the oil 
sector in Norway will also be of great importance. And we will have an interlinkage between 
the oil producing sector and companies that deliver goods and services to the sector. This 
means that Norway will be heavily exposed to oil price shocks that adversely affect our 
trading partners. The decrease of the oil price to $20-30 per barrel, among other notable 
events, during the financial crisis led to declining stock markets.  The Norwegian stock 
market is very reliant on the oil producing sector and a large portion of stocks on the OBX are 
directly affected by the oil price. In the fall of 2007 until Feb. 2009 the stocks on OBX 
experienced a reduction in value of more than 50%. Due to the complexity of finding a 
relevant and simple enough model I could work with, I ended up using a closed economy 
model instead, developed by Matteo Iacoviello for the US economy. Another possible 
extension to the model may be including a housing construction sector in the model as Neri 
and Iacoviello (2010) do in their model. They also add land as another input into the 
production function for new homes. Something that could be of importance since it ads 
another financial accelerator effect in the supply side, in addition to the collateral effects on 
the demand side.   
 I also implemented asset prices into the monetary policy specification in a simplistic 
manner. This was never the main part of this thesis; it is rather meant as an addition to the 
analysis of the financial accelerator and was rather intended as the discussion part of the 
thesis. In the literature on the subject, there are many ways of measuring the effects. 
Iacoviello (2005) uses inflation-output volatility frontiers to measure these effects. Mendicino 
and Pescatori (2005), as well as Faia and Monacelli (2007), measure these effects through a 
welfare function consisting of goods consumption of the households.  
 I have not done any extensive sensitivity analysis of my estimates and data, although I 
had my mind set on doing this from the beginning. Shutting off the shocks and rigidities one 
at the time could have provided me with better insight into how robust my estimates really 
are. Another possible way of doing this is to estimate my model using different data on house 
prices or GDP, use the GDP deflator instead of CPI-ATE, or even use a larger and/or different 
dataset than was used in my model. I looked into the option of using data from further back 
than 1995, and perhaps incorporate more cycles into the model estimation. This option was 
sadly not pursued further due to time limitations. Due to the small sample period in my data, I 
was also sceptic regarding a division of my data into subsamples and see how this may affect 
my estimates. The closest I got to a sensitivity analysis was re-estimating the model using the 
 posterior estimates from the Bache et al. (2010) paper for the monetary policy function and 
inserting a policy specification incorporating residential and non-residential prices.  
 Including more shocks to the economy has proven its worth in replicating the real 
world in a more precise manner than a model consisting of just a few shocks. A more 
complex and realistic model incorporating more shocks is perhaps better at replicating the 
business cycles in the data. It goes without saying that more shocks lead to more explanatory 
power, but it also leads to problems regarding which shocks account for what. This is also a 
possible area of improvement for future analysis. Incorporating more shocks, though, requires 
more observable variables if one wants to avoid the problem of stochastic singularity, 
something I did not pursue further either. Smets and Wouters (2007) use seven types of 
structural shocks, as well as several types of nominal rigidities. Other models, Neri and 
Iacoviello (2010), also incorporate wage rigidities for instance, as well as 6 types of structural 
shocks.   
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7 Conclusion 
 
“Science is facts; just as houses are made of stones, so is science made of facts; but a pile of 
stones is not a house and a collection of facts is not necessarily science.” 
     Henri Poincare, French mathematician and physicist 
 
The financial accelerator effect is a recently discovered phenomenon and, as noted in the 
introduction, there are several different channels the financial accelerator amplification 
mechanism works through.  I have chosen to focus on the financial accelerator mechanism 
within the housing market. Having used a DSGE framework and incorporated heterogeneous 
consumers in a model with financial frictions, I measured the importance of the collateral 
effects via the entrepreneurial sector along with constrained consumers. I then estimated the 
model using a Bayesian approach, calibrated the relevant parameters and estimated the rest. 
The estimation procedure yielded results similar to other research on the area of financial 
accelerators. It is a remarkable fact that there has not been much research going extensively 
into the financial accelerator effect within the Norwegian housing market. This paper is meant 
to shine a light on this area of research and perhaps contribute with some new insights into the 
spillovers from the housing market to the general economy.      
 I found that the collateral effects are very important in amplifying and propagating the 
effects of monetary shocks to the economy. Absent the collateral effects, an increase in the 
demand for housing would produce an increase in housing prices and a reduction in 
consumption. The collateral effects are able to amplify the initial shock through the change in 
the LTV ratio and the capability of borrowers to obtain more financing. This is something the 
traditional wealth effect is not able to explain. The traditional wealth effect postulates that 
developments in the housing market do not yield any aggregate wealth effect per se. The 
reason behind this assumption is because developments in the housing market are just 
considered as a re-distribution away from a first-time borrower to the last-time seller, and not 
an increase in aggregate. This is especially the case since houses are not built to be exported. 
Through the impulse response functions I have shown that consumers displaying ROT type 
behaviour, facing collateral constraints, increase their consumption via Home-Equity-Loans 
following an increase house prices after an iid. monetary policy shock. I also found that a 
technology shock instead decelerates the fluctuations in the economy, shown by the impulse 
responses on consumption. Regulations aimed at restricting the ease of credit for households 
will, ceteris paribus, have greater impact in aggregate demand as well as real house prices, as 
shown through a monetary tightening. The effect on consumption for ROT type consumers is 
greater than the no-collateral scenario, yet below baseline case with LTV ratios of 80% for 
impatient households and 35% for entrepreneurs. In other words, collateral effects and a high 
wage share of unconstrained households lead to the greatest effect on consumption. Lastly, I 
implemented asset prices in the policy specification of the central bank and found that the 
 coefficient assigned to asset prices is not statistically significant at the 1%, 5% or even 10% 
level. This is similar to Iacoviello (2005) study I followed heartily. 
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 Appendix 
Appendix A Data sources 
 
Seasonally adjusted mainland GDP in fixed prices (in million NOK), i.e. excluding the oil 
producing sector   Source: SSB, created Fri Apr 08 16:02:00 CEST 2011 
 
Seasonally adjusted consumer price index – adjusted for taxes and energy prices.          
Source: SSB, created Fri Apr 08 16:05:58 CEST 2011. 
 
Seasonally adjusted Nominal House Price Index (in thousand NOK, per square meter). 
Source: NEF, NFF, Finn.no and Econ Pöyry, created Fri Apr 08 16:10:23 CEST 2011. 
 
3 Month NIBOR rate, average value from daily notations. Source: Norges Bank 
 
Savings ratios for several OECD countries, Economic Outlook No. 88 – December 2010 – 
Annual Projections for OECD Countries. www.OECD.org 
http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=EO88_INTERNET 
Financial assets and liabilities for Norwegian households per 31 December 2010. 
www.SSB.no 
http://www.ssb.no/english/yearbook/tab/tab-302.html 
 
Estimation was done using Dynare 4.2.0, a freeware programming code usable inside Matlab 
or Octave, downloadable from here: http://www.dynare.org/download 
Data was handled using Matlab R2010b, http://www.mathworks.com/  
Graphs and charts were drawn using MS Excel, MS Words and SmartDraw VP (can be 
downloaded from http://www.smartdraw.com/ ) 
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Appendix B HP-filter 
 
Hodrick-Prescott Filter is a smoothing technique used to detrend dataseries, ie. it removes 
short-term fluctuations that are related to business cycles. It therefore is a neat trick to reveal 
long term trends in the data.  
Mathematically it can be expressed as: 
                                   
      or 
                 
   
{  }
∑      )
    ∑(        )           ))
 
   
   
 
   
 
Where the first sum denotes the goodness of fit and the second term denotes the penalty for 
Roughness. λ denotes the smoothing parameter and is in the literature 1600 when considering 
quarterly data.  
 
Real GDP and real house prices have been detrended using HP-filter. If x is the m x m matrix 
I wish to detrend, I first take log of x and then run it through a Matlab code using the 
following command:          )            )      )  where 1600 is the smoothing 
number.  
The Matlab code can be found here:  
http://www.krannert.purdue.edu/faculty/knaknoi/Econ635/matlab_filter.html 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Appendix C Estimation and simulation output 
 
ESTIMATION OUPUT 
 
Estimation results, taken from Dynare4.2.0 
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Graphs of the the check_plot function in Dynare4.2.0, showing that maximum is truly found 
The vertical line should coincide with the maximum of the log post (blue) curve, as is the case 
for all except the AR(1) coefficient for cost-push shock:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Smoothed shocks, these should be around zero. They are indeed around zero.  
  
 
Estimation results when with alternative policy specification 
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Check-plots: 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Prior- and posterior distributions: 
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Smoothed Shocks: The shocks are around zero as is expected. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Smoothed variables: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Simulation results, taken from dynare4.2.0 
Correlation matrix of the simulated model using m=0.35 and m’’=0.8: 
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Correlation matrix of the simulated model using m=m’’=0: 
 
Correlation matrix of the simulated model using α=0.2, m=0.35 and m’’=0.8 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Simulation results from estimated model incorporating asset prices in the policy specification.  
 Impulse responses to a technology shock. Black curve depicts the case when rq=0, blue curve when 
rq=0.04 (estimated value) and green curve when rq=0.15 (implied by Iacoviello (2005)). 
 
 Impulse responses to a cost-push shock. Black curve depicts the case when rq=0, blue curve when 
rq=0.04 (estimated value) and green curve when rq=0.15 (implied by Iacoviello (2005)). 
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Simulation when rq=0 
 
Simulation when rq=0.03 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Simulation when rq=0.15 
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Dynare4.2.0 Model Code obtained through the macro model database 
 
 
// Model: US_IAC05 
  
// Further references: 
// Matteo Iacoviello. 2005. "House Prices, Borrowing Constraints, and 
Monetary Policy in the Business Cycle" 
// the American Economic Review 95, pp. 739-764. 
  
  
//% basic endogenous variable 
var Yhat chat c1hat c2hat Ihat Khat Xhat qhat bhat b2hat hhat h2hat Rhat 
pihat rrhat 
  
//% Endogenous variables with exogenous dynamics 
jhat Ahat uhat; 
  
  
//% Declaration of exogenous variables (shocks) 
varexo 
ejhat, 
euhat, 
eAhat, 
eRhat; 
  
parameters  
  
//% deep parameters 
beta, 
beta2, 
gamma, 
j, 
eta, 
my, 
ypsilon, 
psi, 
delta, 
fie, 
fih, 
X, 
theta, 
alfa, 
m, 
m2, 
rhou, 
rhoj, 
rhoA, 
rR, 
rpi, 
rY, 
gammae, 
gammah, 
omega, 
kappa, 
s1, 
s2, 
qhtoY, 
btoY, 
c1toY, 
qh1toY, 
qh2toY, 
htoh1, 
h2toh1, 
b2toY, 
c2toY, 
ctoY, 
ItoY, 
jota, 
jota2, 
h1ss, 
sigmau, 
sigmaj, 
sigmaA, 
sigmaR, 
R; 
  
  
//% Setting of numerical values for parameters 
 
 beta = 0.9994; 
beta2 = 0.97; 
gamma = 0.97; 
j = 0.2; 
eta = 1.01; 
my = 0.3; 
ypsilon = 0.03; 
psi = 2; 
delta = 0.0180; 
fie = 0; 
fih = 0; 
X = 1.20; 
theta = 0.75; 
alfa = 0.65; 
m = 0.35; 
m2 = 0.8; 
rhou = 0.8; 
rhoj = 0.8; 
rhoA = 0.8; 
rR = 0.8; 
rpi = 2; 
rY = 0.2; 
//sigmau = 0.01; 
//sigmaj = 0.01; 
//sigmaA = 0.01; 
//sigmaR = 0.01; 
 
 
//% Defined parameters 
gammae = (1-m)*gamma + m*beta; 
gammah = beta2+m2*(beta-beta2); 
omega = (beta2-m2*beta2)/(1-m2*beta); 
kappa = (1-theta)*(1-beta*theta)/theta; 
s1 = (alfa*(1-my-ypsilon)+X-1)/X; 
s2 = (1-alfa)*(1-my-ypsilon)/X; 
qhtoY = gamma*ypsilon/(X*(1-gammae)); 
btoY = beta*m*qhtoY; 
  
  
qh1toY = j*s1/(1-beta)+j*m*qhtoY+j*m2*s2/(1-beta2-m2*(beta-beta2-j*(1-
beta))); 
qh2toY = j*s2/(1-beta2-m2*(beta-beta2-j*(1-beta))); 
  
c1toY = s1+(1-beta)*(m*qhtoY+m2*qh2toY); 
  
htoh1 = qhtoY/qh1toY; 
h2toh1 = qh2toY/qh1toY; 
  
b2toY = j*beta*m2/(1-beta2-m2*(beta-beta2)+j*m2*(1-beta))*s2; 
  
c2toY = s2*(1-beta2-m2*(beta-beta2))/(1-beta2-m2*(beta-beta2)+j*m2*(1-
beta)); 
  
ctoY = (my+ypsilon-delta*gamma*my/(1-gamma*(1-delta))-(1-
beta)*m*X*qhtoY)/X; 
ItoY = 1-ctoY-c1toY-c2toY; 
jota = (1-beta)*htoh1; 
jota2 = (1-beta)*h2toh1; 
R = 1/beta; 
  
  
model(linear); 
  
Yhat = ctoY*chat+c1toY*c1hat+c2toY*c2hat+ItoY*Ihat; 
  
c1hat = c1hat(+1)-rrhat; 
  
Ihat = Khat(-1)+gamma*(Ihat(+1)-Khat)+(1-gamma*(1-delta))*(Yhat(+1)-
Xhat(+1)-Khat)/(psi) 
     +(chat-chat(+1))/(psi); 
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qhat = gammae*qhat(+1)+(1-gammae)*(Yhat(+1)-Xhat(+1)-hhat)-m*beta*rrhat 
     -(1-m*beta)*(chat(+1)-chat)-fie*(hhat-hhat(-1)-gamma*(hhat(+1)-hhat)); 
  
qhat = gammah*qhat(+1)+(1-gammah)*(jhat-h2hat)-m2*beta*rrhat+(1-
m2*beta)*(c2hat-omega*c2hat(+1)) 
     -fih*(h2hat-h2hat(-1)-beta2*(h2hat(+1)-h2hat)); 
  
qhat = beta*qhat(+1)+(1-beta)*jhat+jota*hhat+jota2*h2hat+c1hat-
beta*c1hat(+1) 
     +fih*(htoh1*(hhat-hhat(-1))+h2toh1*(h2hat-h2hat(-1))-
beta*htoh1*(hhat(+1)-hhat)-beta*h2toh1*(h2hat(+1)-h2hat)); 
  
bhat = qhat(+1)+hhat-rrhat; 
  
b2hat = qhat(+1)+h2hat-rrhat; 
  
Yhat = eta*(Ahat+ypsilon*hhat(-1)+my*Khat(-1))/(eta-(1-ypsilon-my)) 
     -(1-ypsilon-my)*(Xhat+alfa*c1hat+(1-alfa)*c2hat)/(eta-(1-ypsilon-my)); 
  
pihat = beta*pihat(+1)-kappa*Xhat+uhat; 
  
Khat = delta*Ihat+(1-delta)*Khat(-1); 
  
btoY*bhat = ctoY*chat+qhtoY*(hhat-hhat(-1))+ItoY*Ihat+R*btoY*(Rhat(-
1)+bhat(-1)-pihat) 
          -(1-s1-s2)*(Yhat-Xhat); 
  
b2toY*b2hat = c2toY*c2hat+qh2toY*(h2hat-h2hat(-1))+R*b2toY*(b2hat(-
1)+Rhat(-1)-pihat)-s2*(Yhat-Xhat); 
  
Rhat = (1-rR)*(1+rpi)*pihat(-1)+rY*(1-rR)*Yhat(-1)+rR*Rhat(-1)+eRhat; 
  
 
//************************************************************************* 
//Alternative policy specification 
 
//Rhat = rR*Rhat(-1)+(1-rR)*(rq*qhat+(1+rpi)*pihat(-1)+rY*Yhat(-1))+eRhat; 
 
//************************************************************************* 
 
//% Defined variable(s) 
rrhat = Rhat-pihat(+1); 
  
//% equations for variables with exogenous AR(1)-dynamics 
jhat = rhoj*jhat(-1)+ejhat; 
uhat = rhou*uhat(-1)+euhat; 
Ahat = rhoA*Ahat(-1)+eAhat; 
  
end;                   
      
//************************************************************************* 
         //Needed to simulate the model 
      //shocks; 
            //var eRhat; 
            //stderr sigmaR; 
            //var euhat; 
            //stderr sigmau; 
             //var ejhat; 
            //stderr sigmaj; 
            //var eAhat; 
            //stderr sigmaA; 
            //end; 
  
  
            //stoch_simul(periods=5000,simul_seed=1, irf=20) Yhat Rhat qhat 
pihat chat c2hat; 
 
//************************************************************************* 
  
estimated_params;   
  
stderr eRhat, inv_gamma_pdf,0.01,0.05;                       
stderr euhat, inv_gamma_pdf,0.01,0.05;                        
stderr ejhat, inv_gamma_pdf,0.01,0.05;                    
stderr eAhat, inv_gamma_pdf,0.01,0.05;                                       
rhou, beta_pdf, 0.8, .1; 
rhoj, beta_pdf, 0.8, .1; 
rhoA, beta_pdf, 0.8, .1; 
alfa, beta_pdf, 0.65, 0.05; 
my, beta_pdf, 0.3, .02; 
theta, beta_pdf, 0.75, 0.05; 
rR, beta_pdf, 0.8, 0.1; 
//rY, normal_pdf, 0.2, 0.15; 
rpi, gamma_pdf, 2, 0.1; 
  
  
end; 
  
  
estimated_params_bounds; 
stderr eRhat, 0.0001, 100; 
stderr euhat, 0.0001, 100;                   
stderr ejhat, 0.0001, 100; 
stderr eAhat, 0.0001, 100; 
rhou, .001,.9999; 
rhoj, .001,.9999; 
rhoA, .0001,.9999; 
alfa, 0,.99; 
my, 0,.99; 
theta, 0,.99; 
rR, 0,.9999; 
//rY, 0,10; 
rpi,0,10; 
  
end; 
  
  
estimated_params_init; 
stderr eRhat, 0.01; 
stderr euhat, 0.01; 
stderr ejhat, 0.01; 
stderr eAhat, 0.01; 
rhou, 0.8; 
rhoj, 0.8; 
rhoA, 0.8; 
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alfa, 0.65; 
my, 0.3; 
theta, 0.75; 
rR, 0.9; 
//rY, 0.2; 
rpi, 2; 
end; 
  
  
varobs Yhat pihat qhat Rhat;   
  
// bayesestimation  
  
estimation(datafile=”filename”,conf_sig 
=.95,smoother,mode_check,mode_compute=1,mh_replic=2000,mh_jscale=0.55,mh_nb
locks=1,prior_trunc=0) Yhat Rhat pihat qhat chat c1hat c2hat; 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Appendix D Data manipulation  
 
 Real GDP was log transformed and HP-filtered via Matlab R2010b 
 Real house prices were found by using the following formula:  
 
Real Houseprices = Nominal Houseprices/Price Index 
 
 Real house prices were then log transformed and HP-filtered 
 3-Month annualised NIBOR was given in monthly values, from daily notations. Quarter average was 
found and demeaned by deducting the average of the time series from 1995-2010. Was then 
multiplied by 3 and divided by 12 in order to de-annualise them. Was also divided by 100 in order to 
be directly compared to the other time-series. 
 CPI-ATE was seasonally adjusted and given in monthly values. Quarter average was found and 
demeaned by deducting the mean of the time series. Divided by 100 in order to be directly compared 
to GDP and house prices. The inflation rate was found using the following formula:  
 
Inflation Rate = (           )        
 
 The first observation is therefore lost using this transformation, yielding me 63 observations instead of 
64. 
 
 
 
 
  CPI-ATE   NIBOR   GDP  House price index 
01.01.1995 91.30 januar 95 5.76 01.01.1995 257113 1995Q1 40.3 
01.02.1995 91.50 februar 95 5.46 01.04.1995 258120 1995Q2 42 
01.03.1995 91.70 mars 95 5.39 01.07.1995 262294 1995Q3 42.7 
01.04.1995 91.80 april 95 5.36 01.10.1995 260635 1995Q4 43.2 
01.05.1995 91.90 mai 95 5.67 01.01.1996 263442 1996Q1 43.7 
01.06.1995 92.00 juni 95 5.79 01.04.1996 261907 1996Q2 45.7 
01.07.1995 92.10 juli 95 5.62 01.07.1996 266038 1996Q3 46.6 
01.08.1995 92.30 august 95 5.34 01.10.1996 266835 1996Q4 47.7 
01.09.1995 92.40 
september 
95 5.36 01.01.1997 268386 1997Q1 48.4 
01.10.1995 92.60 oktober 95 5.34 01.04.1997 277845 1997Q2 51.8 
01.11.1995 92.60 november 95 5.22 01.07.1997 279446 1997Q3 52.3 
01.12.1995 92.80 desember 95 5.43 01.10.1997 283821 1997Q4 52.9 
01.01.1996 92.40 januar 96 5.48 01.01.1998 283573 1998Q1 55.2 
01.02.1996 92.30 februar 96 5.26 01.04.1998 288195 1998Q2 58.6 
01.03.1996 92.40 mars 96 4.92 01.07.1998 288959 1998Q3 58 
01.04.1996 92.50 april 96 4.70 01.10.1998 290378 1998Q4 56.5 
01.05.1996 92.70 mai 96 4.76 01.01.1999 289421 1999Q1 58.7 
01.06.1996 92.70 juni 96 4.93 01.04.1999 290163 1999Q2 63.4 
01.07.1996 93.10 juli 96 4.99 01.07.1999 293346 1999Q3 64.7 
01.08.1996 93.30 august 96 5.02 01.10.1999 295339 1999Q4 67 
01.09.1996 93.40 
september 
96 5.09 01.01.2000 299104 2000Q1 71 
01.10.1996 93.50 oktober 96 5.04 01.04.2000 298979 2000Q2 75.7 
01.11.1996 93.70 november 96 4.39 01.07.2000 300975 2000Q3 73.5 
01.12.1996 93.90 desember 96 4.14 01.10.2000 301616 2000Q4 73.5 
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01.01.1997 94.20 januar 97 3.52 01.01.2001 305141 2001Q1 76.2 
01.02.1997 94.40 februar 97 3.52 01.04.2001 305315 2001Q2 79.5 
01.03.1997 94.40 mars 97 3.51 01.07.2001 304797 2001Q3 79.5 
01.04.1997 94.60 april 97 3.50 01.10.2001 308003 2001Q4 79.2 
01.05.1997 94.70 mai 97 3.46 01.01.2002 307654 2002Q1 81.8 
01.06.1997 95.00 juni 97 3.51 01.04.2002 309520 2002Q2 84.8 
01.07.1997 95.10 juli 97 4.00 01.07.2002 309260 2002Q3 81.9 
01.08.1997 95.40 august 97 4.04 01.10.2002 307074 2002Q4 81.4 
01.09.1997 95.50 
september 
97 3.94 01.01.2003 306999 2003Q1 83.3 
01.10.1997 95.70 oktober 97 3.97 01.04.2003 312079 2003Q2 83.9 
01.11.1997 95.90 november 97 3.95 01.07.2003 313408 2003Q3 83.7 
01.12.1997 96.10 desember 97 3.87 01.10.2003 312233 2003Q4 84.7 
01.01.1998 96.50 januar 98 3.82 01.01.2004 317103 2004Q1 91 
01.02.1998 96.80 februar 98 3.84 01.04.2004 319578 2004Q2 92.4 
01.03.1998 97.10 mars 98 4.08 01.07.2004 324773 2004Q3 92.6 
01.04.1998 97.30 april 98 4.15 01.10.2004 325733 2004Q4 93.6 
01.05.1998 97.40 mai 98 4.47 01.01.2005 329575 2005Q1 97.5 
01.06.1998 97.60 juni 98 4.82 01.04.2005 334540 2005Q2 100.2 
01.07.1998 97.90 juli 98 5.35 01.07.2005 336781 2005Q3 101.1 
01.08.1998 98.10 august 98 6.74 01.10.2005 343155 2005Q4 101.2 
01.09.1998 98.40 
september 
98 8.03 01.01.2006 340826 2006Q1 107.5 
01.10.1998 98.60 oktober 98 7.92 01.04.2006 345999 2006Q2 112.8 
01.11.1998 98.80 november 98 7.96 01.07.2006 349666 2006Q3 116.5 
01.12.1998 99.00 desember 98 8.24 01.10.2006 360878 2006Q4 117.9 
01.01.1999 99.10 januar 99 7.72 01.01.2007 359610 2007Q1 125.3 
01.02.1999 99.10 februar 99 7.27 01.04.2007 362955 2007Q2 130 
01.03.1999 99.80 mars 99 6.88 01.07.2007 369173 2007Q3 129.8 
01.04.1999 99.90 april 99 6.55 01.10.2007 372767 2007Q4 126.9 
01.05.1999 99.90 mai 99 6.66 01.01.2008 372161 2008Q1 129.9 
01.06.1999 100.00 juni 99 6.48 01.04.2008 376986 2008Q2 131.5 
01.07.1999 100.00 juli 99 6.35 01.07.2008 376285 2008Q3 127 
01.08.1999 99.90 august 99 6.09 01.10.2008 372626 2008Q4 118.1 
01.09.1999 100.20 
september 
99 5.97 01.01.2009 370826 2009Q1 123 
01.10.1999 100.50 oktober 99 6.37 01.04.2009 370841 2009Q2 129.5 
01.11.1999 100.70 november 99 6.15 01.07.2009 369872 2009Q3 131.8 
01.12.1999 100.80 desember 99 5.97 01.10.2009 372285 2009Q4 131.8 
01.01.2000 101.10 januar 00 5.88 01.01.2010 374866 2010Q1 136.3 
01.02.2000 101.30 februar 00 5.89 01.04.2010 377350 2010Q2 141.3 
01.03.2000 101.40 mars 00 6.00 01.07.2010 381035 2010Q3 140.6 
01.04.2000 101.70 april 00 6.23 01.10.2010 382163 2010Q4 140.5 
01.05.2000 101.80 mai 00 6.50 
    01.06.2000 102.20 juni 00 6.72 
    01.07.2000 102.30 juli 00 6.91 
    01.08.2000 102.70 august 00 7.12 
    01.09.2000 103.00 
september 
00 7.33 
    
 01.10.2000 103.10 oktober 00 7.52 
    01.11.2000 103.30 november 00 7.43 
    01.12.2000 103.50 desember 00 7.42 
    01.01.2001 103.80 januar 01 7.41 
    01.02.2001 104.30 februar 01 7.32 
    01.03.2001 104.20 mars 01 7.39 
    01.04.2001 104.30 april 01 7.48 
    01.05.2001 104.50 mai 01 7.45 
    01.06.2001 104.70 juni 01 7.42 
    01.07.2001 104.90 juli 01 7.37 
    01.08.2001 105.20 august 01 7.31 
    01.09.2001 105.40 
september 
01 7.14 
    01.10.2001 105.60 oktober 01 6.94 
    01.11.2001 105.90 november 01 6.90 
    01.12.2001 106.20 desember 01 6.59 
    01.01.2002 106.40 januar 02 6.32 
    01.02.2002 106.50 februar 02 6.57 
    01.03.2002 106.90 mars 02 6.72 
    01.04.2002 106.80 april 02 6.77 
    01.05.2002 107.30 mai 02 6.90 
    01.06.2002 107.50 juni 02 7.12 
    01.07.2002 107.80 juli 02 7.25 
    01.08.2002 107.70 august 02 7.26 
    01.09.2002 107.70 
september 
02 7.15 
    01.10.2002 107.80 oktober 02 7.12 
    01.11.2002 107.90 november 02 7.09 
    01.12.2002 108.10 desember 02 6.62 
    01.01.2003 108.40 januar 03 5.99 
    01.02.2003 108.70 februar 03 5.69 
    01.03.2003 108.40 mars 03 5.49 
    01.04.2003 108.50 april 03 5.26 
    01.05.2003 108.60 mai 03 4.92 
    01.06.2003 108.50 juni 03 4.04 
    01.07.2003 108.60 juli 03 3.45 
    01.08.2003 108.60 august 03 3.14 
    01.09.2003 108.60 
september 
03 2.81 
    01.10.2003 108.60 oktober 03 2.86 
    01.11.2003 108.50 november 03 2.89 
    01.12.2003 108.50 desember 03 2.64 
    01.01.2004 108.50 januar 04 2.26 
    01.02.2004 108.60 februar 04 2.01 
    01.03.2004 108.70 mars 04 1.84 
    01.04.2004 108.70 april 04 1.97 
    01.05.2004 108.70 mai 04 1.99 
    01.06.2004 108.80 juni 04 2.03 
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01.07.2004 108.90 juli 04 2.02 
    01.08.2004 108.80 august 04 2.02 
    01.09.2004 109.10 
september 
04 1.96 
    01.10.2004 109.20 oktober 04 2.00 
    01.11.2004 109.40 november 04 1.99 
    01.12.2004 109.50 desember 04 1.99 
    01.01.2005 109.40 januar 05 1.96 
    01.02.2005 109.40 februar 05 1.92 
    01.03.2005 109.50 mars 05 2.02 
    01.04.2005 109.70 april 05 2.05 
    01.05.2005 109.90 mai 05 2.08 
    01.06.2005 110.00 juni 05 2.15 
    01.07.2005 110.10 juli 05 2.22 
    01.08.2005 110.30 august 05 2.25 
    01.09.2005 110.40 
september 
05 2.35 
    01.10.2005 110.50 oktober 05 2.45 
    01.11.2005 110.50 november 05 2.54 
    01.12.2005 110.50 desember 05 2.55 
    01.01.2006 110.50 januar 06 2.52 
    01.02.2006 110.50 februar 06 2.57 
    01.03.2006 110.40 mars 06 2.72 
    01.04.2006 110.60 april 06 2.82 
    01.05.2006 110.70 mai 06 2.94 
    01.06.2006 110.90 juni 06 3.03 
    01.07.2006 110.90 juli 06 3.09 
    01.08.2006 110.70 august 06 3.23 
    01.09.2006 111.00 
september 
06 3.37 
    01.10.2006 111.30 oktober 06 3.48 
    01.11.2006 111.50 november 06 3.62 
    01.12.2006 111.60 desember 06 3.80 
    01.01.2007 111.60 januar 07 3.98 
    01.02.2007 111.80 februar 07 4.20 
    01.03.2007 112.10 mars 07 4.43 
    01.04.2007 112.10 april 07 4.54 
    01.05.2007 112.20 mai 07 4.60 
    01.06.2007 112.20 juni 07 4.75 
    01.07.2007 112.30 juli 07 4.89 
    01.08.2007 112.70 august 07 5.18 
    01.09.2007 112.80 
september 
07 5.50 
    01.10.2007 112.90 oktober 07 5.67 
    01.11.2007 113.20 november 07 5.78 
    01.12.2007 113.60 desember 07 5.96 
    01.01.2008 113.80 januar 08 5.79 
    01.02.2008 114.20 februar 08 5.91 
    01.03.2008 114.50 mars 08 6.18 
    
 01.04.2008 114.70 april 08 6.30 
    01.05.2008 114.90 mai 08 6.48 
    01.06.2008 114.90 juni 08 6.41 
    01.07.2008 115.60 juli 08 6.46 
    01.08.2008 115.90 august 08 6.53 
    01.09.2008 116.20 
september 
08 6.82 
    01.10.2008 116.60 oktober 08 6.92 
    01.11.2008 116.40 november 08 6.18 
    01.12.2008 116.60 desember 08 4.64 
    01.01.2009 117.00 januar 09 3.70 
    01.02.2009 117.60 februar 09 3.48 
    01.03.2009 117.60 mars 09 3.17 
    01.04.2009 117.90 april 09 2.87 
    01.05.2009 118.10 mai 09 2.40 
    01.06.2009 118.60 juni 09 2.10 
    01.07.2009 118.60 juli 09 1.87 
    01.08.2009 118.60 august 09 1.88 
    01.09.2009 119.00 
september 
09 1.93 
    01.10.2009 119.00 oktober 09 2.03 
    01.11.2009 119.20 november 09 2.05 
    01.12.2009 119.40 desember 09 2.08 
    01.01.2010 119.70 januar 10 2.25 
    01.02.2010 119.80 februar 10 2.27 
    01.03.2010 119.70 mars 10 2.30 
    01.04.2010 119.80 april 10 2.39 
    01.05.2010 120.00 mai 10 2.50 
    01.06.2010 120.10 juni 10 2.67 
    01.07.2010 120.10 juli 10 2.69 
    01.08.2010 120.20 august 10 2.65 
    01.09.2010 120.10 
september 
10 2.64 
    01.10.2010 120.30 oktober 10 2.56 
    01.11.2010 120.40 november 10 2.51 
    01.12.2010 120.60 desember 10 2.59 
    01.01.2011 120.50 januar 11 2.59 
    01.02.2011 120.60 februar 11 2.61 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
Yhat qhat Rhat pihat     
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1995Q2 -0.00208 0.01717 0.002315 -2.5E-06 
1995Q3 0.00621 0.00711 0.001902 -0.00038 
1995Q4 -0.00789 -0.00785 0.001631 -3.9E-05 
1996Q1 -0.00494 -0.02297 0.001356 -0.00761 
1996Q2 -0.01854 -0.00489 0.000294 -0.00149 
1996Q3 -0.01065 -0.01210 0.000882 0.002463 
1996Q4 -0.01541 -0.01552 -0.00039 0.000272 
1997Q1 -0.01732 -0.02772 -0.0029 0.002385 
1997Q2 0.00969 0.01341 -0.00298 0.00022 
1997Q3 0.00792 -0.00371 -0.00171 0.001606 
1997Q4 0.01609 -0.01895 -0.00187 0.00157 
1998Q1 0.00803 -0.00293 -0.00191 0.005011 
1998Q2 0.01722 0.03045 -0.0005 0.002169 
1998Q3 0.01312 -0.00602 0.005076 0.00281 
1998Q4 0.01149 -0.05818 0.008401 0.002419 
1999Q1 0.00189 -0.04567 0.006528 0.001024 
1999Q2 -0.00163 0.00600 0.004705 0.001666 
1999Q3 0.00341 0.00137 0.003647 -0.00337 
1999Q4 0.00450 0.01189 0.003716 0.001957 
2000Q1 0.01168 0.04609 0.003114 0.001586 
2000Q2 0.00595 0.08710 0.004512 0.00188 
2000Q3 0.00744 0.03528 0.0061 0.00315 
2000Q4 0.00452 0.01371 0.006947 0.001795 
2001Q1 0.01120 0.02896 0.006732 0.00337 
2001Q2 0.00689 0.05124 0.006925 -0.00053 
2001Q3 0.00033 0.03179 0.006486 0.002006 
2001Q4 0.00591 0.00915 0.005326 0.002599 
2002Q1 -0.00017 0.02308 0.004642 0.002236 
2002Q2 0.00082 0.04111 0.005622 0.001254 
2002Q3 -0.00525 -0.01141 0.006347 0.000601 
2002Q4 -0.01777 -0.03513 0.005661 -0.00252 
2003Q1 -0.02370 -0.02968 0.002613 0.000876 
2003Q2 -0.01327 -0.04025 0.000146 -0.00407 
2003Q3 -0.01530 -0.06061 -0.00386 -0.00376 
2003Q4 -0.02566 -0.06701 -0.0047 -0.00499 
2004Q1 -0.01711 -0.01387 -0.00661 -0.00376 
2004Q2 -0.01657 -0.01753 -0.00672 -0.00315 
2004Q3 -0.00795 -0.03460 -0.00671 -0.00253 
2004Q4 -0.01276 -0.04338 -0.00671 -0.0004 
2005Q1 -0.00899 -0.02230 -0.00678 -0.00376 
2005Q2 -0.00215 -0.01488 -0.00646 -0.00041 
2005Q3 -0.00369 -0.02590 -0.006 -0.00073 
2005Q4 0.00680 -0.04484 -0.00542 -0.00226 
2006Q1 -0.00826 -0.00422 -0.00519 -0.00468 
2006Q2 -0.00138 0.02444 -0.00437 -0.00196 
2006Q3 0.00110 0.03768 -0.00362 -0.00317 
 2006Q4 0.02479 0.03118 -0.00261 0.001038 
2007Q1 0.01364 0.07428 -0.00119 -0.00108 
2007Q2 0.01556 0.09411 -0.00012 -0.00139 
2007Q3 0.02553 0.07638 0.001277 -0.00051 
2007Q4 0.02855 0.03840 0.002813 0.001251 
2008Q1 0.02060 0.04711 0.003206 0.003869 
2008Q2 0.02752 0.04535 0.00429 0.001465 
2008Q3 0.02002 -0.00296 0.004804 0.004915 
2008Q4 0.00490 -0.08872 0.003096 0.00109 
2009Q1 -0.00505 -0.06094 -0.00307 0.003063 
2009Q2 -0.00994 -0.02216 -0.00555 0.00244 
2009Q3 -0.01735 -0.01718 -0.00697 0.000138 
2009Q4 -0.01556 -0.02975 -0.00656 -0.00044 
2010Q1 -0.01331 -0.00872 -0.00601 0.0001 
2010Q2 -0.01133 0.01479 -0.0054 -0.00243 
2010Q3 -0.00622 -0.00267 -0.00505 -0.00298 
2010Q4 -0.00787 -0.01586 -0.00532 -0.00188 
 
     
     
 
